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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an extensive analysis of the reputation management of the Dutch 
Authority of the Financial Markets (AFM) in the period 2006 to 2016. Within the 
academic literature on financial regulation, reputational considerations are slowly 
drawing more attention amongst those who study political science and public 
administration. There is however still a great deal of work to be done in this field. I 
looked at the communication of AFM by analyzing eighty-seven speeches made by AFM 
board members in this period and complemented this quantitative section of my 
research with the results from seven in-depth qualitative interviews with experts and 
representatives from the regulated industry in the Netherlands. Building on the work of 
Daniel Carpenter (2010) and his different forms of reputation and audiences, I offer a 
review of the reputation management of a Dutch regulatory agency, both from the 
perspective of the AFM itself as well as its interpretation in the regulated industry. My 
results show that reputation management is a difficult process in which bridging the gap 
between the desired image and the existing reputation amongst an audience is 
challenging. I will also argue that the reputation of the AFM has changed significantly in 
this period due to pressures resulting from the financial crisis of 2008 as the regulator 
grew more strict and pro-active.  Nonetheless, the impact of a growth in transnational 
networks in financial regulation on the reputation management of the AFM seems 
minimal. This can be explained by the forerunner role that the Netherlands has in 
European financial regulation: most newly introduced European standards already 
existed in the Netherlands. Overall, the conclusion of this paper will provide an answer 
to the question why and how the reputation management of the AFM has changed in 
times of financial crisis and increasing internationalization of financial regulation.  
 
 
Keywords: financial regulation, reputation, reputation management, financial crisis, 
transnational networks, the Netherlands, Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), 
regulated industry.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction     
The way to build a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to appear. Over 
2,500 years ago, the famous Greek scholar Socrates already indicated with these words 
that reputation management is all about bridging the gap between one’s desired image 
and actual reputation. Strikingly enough, Socrates also wrote about how money makes 
people distrust each other. His ideas might be said to have prophesized current 
developments as the world of financial regulation is at present going through some of its 
hardest times. Trust in the financial system is at one of its lowest points ever as agencies 
responsible for financial regulation have been criticized for their role in the recent crisis.  
Changes in the financial system were deemed to be necessary. One response to this 
trend of distrust in Europe has been to increase the number of transnational networks 
involved in financial regulation as global economic relations have become ever more 
complex. This European regulatory space had already been expanding vastly since the 
early 2000s, but the movement towards a new regulatory architecture was especially 
enhanced with the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. Since the financial 
crisis, policy-makers all over Europe have called for more rules and closer cooperation 
between different European nations to prevent another global financial crisis. 
The European regulatory landscape however remains split between different national 
contexts. Therefore, domestic agencies together with other national participants in 
transnational networks play an important role in the functioning and success of both 
national as well as international regulation. In short, regulatory capacity was thus 
extended in Europe through two considerable forms of institutionalization: agencies and 
networks (Levi-Faur, 2011: 811). But there are still many questions remaining in 
academic and government research that links domestic agencies and the impact of 
transnational networks. One of these questions is what precisely does the growth of 
decision-making in transnational networks mean for the domestic position and 
reputation of a regulatory agency in times of international financial crisis? If decisions 
are increasingly made at the international level, will we still need national regulators 
such as the AFM in its current organizational form?  
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In this paper, I will discuss how the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) has 
advanced its reputation towards the regulated industry since the financial crisis of 2008 
and the advent of several international networks in financial regulation. Analyzing 
eighty-seven speeches made by AFM board members in the period 2006 to 2016, an 
overview is given of how the Dutch regulatory agency has changed its message towards 
the industry in the last decade. Two interviews with experts on Dutch financial 
regulation offer my analysis complementary views on the reputation of the AFM 
towards the regulated industry. Five interviews with representatives of Dutch firms in 
the regulated industry provide an impression of how the message and actions of the 
AFM are received amongst this audience and if the desired effects on the reputation of 
the AFM are indeed effective: a question of reputation management.  
 
1.2 Academic and social relevance of this research 
What is currently missing in the literature on regulation that my research can provide? I 
argue that the relevance of this paper is twofold: both academic as well as social.  
There are several reasons why I believe that the findings of my research will be of 
academic relevance. The functioning of regulatory agencies and the crucial role of 
regulators in the successful operation of national economies has been a subject for 
discussion within the academic world for several decades. As such, academics have 
made great efforts to understand how regulatory agencies function and what drives 
their decisions and behavior. There is disagreement however on these specifics of how 
regulatory agencies operate and hence what factors may be important for a regulatory 
agency to succeed in its tasks. Within this field, a growing body of academic research has 
recognized the importance of reputational considerations as a variable explaining the 
behavior of regulatory agencies.  
The impact of the financial crisis has led to a fundamental change in the context of work 
by regulatory agencies. In addition, networks have grown in importance in recent 
academic work on regulation. International networks such as the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) have gained a pivotal position in European financial 
regulation. Although much has been written on functional explanations for the existence 
of these transnational networks, there still seems to be a lack of thorough empirical 
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knowledge of the domestic impact of these transnational networks (Kelemen, 2002; 
O’Toole, 2015).  Thus, in this context, an important question is what the consequences of 
the financial crisis and these forms of international cooperation are for the relationship 
between national regulator and the industry it regulates. What has the crisis meant for 
their regulator’s reputation? How has their participation in international networks 
changed their reputation towards the industry? Do they emphasize different aspects of 
their work to retain and improve their reputation with the industry now a large part of 
their work involves international networks?  These questions hint at further research 
into the domestic impact of the participation of regulatory agencies in transnational 
networks.  
There is still a great amount of work to be done in the field (Maor; 2014, Carpenter; 
2010). To expand and strengthen contemporary theoretical work and add to the 
literature on reputational considerations, academic research that offers empirical 
analysis of changes in the regulatory context and their impact on domestic 
understandings is called for. This is where my research aims to fill a gap in the academic 
literature on the functioning, behavior and specifically the reputation of regulatory 
agencies. It offers an analysis of the micro-mechanisms behind broader (macro) 
explanations for changes in the behavior and position of national regulators. More 
specifically, its goal is to illustrate how European regulatory agencies have been forced 
to alter their reputation towards the regulated industry because of changes in the 
national and international context. I expect that my findings will offer those who study 
public administration further insight into national regulatory dynamics. 
This paper also offers insights that are of social relevance. Academic research is about 
understanding how the world around us functions and a large part of how society 
functions is to do with the stability of the financial system. Regulatory agencies are of 
crucial importance in the field of European financial regulation (European Commission, 
2016). Many authors and governmental experts have spent their time studying national 
agencies in an effort to understand the conduct of these bureaucracies. However, little 
has been written since the advent of the Great Recession of recent years on the behavior 
of regulatory agencies in the European financial industry and on what the domestic 
impact of this growth in transnational cooperation has been for the relationship 
between regulator and regulated industry. This is a surprising insight, when one 
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recognizes the pivotal role of regulatory agencies in preventing a new major financial 
meltdown. It is also somewhat surprising considering the wave of Euro criticism that 
has developed in the last decade: focusing on the mechanisms behind European 
cooperation and its domestic impact might improve our understanding and hopefully 
benefit future work in European networks. These micro mechanisms are crucial as they 
are the key to successful financial regulation that, as one of the most important results of 
academic research in this field, protects participants in the financial system. 
 
1.3 Research question and objective 
The aim of this paper is to add both to the body of academic literature on reputational 
calculations for public organizations and to provide an answer to empirical questions on 
the functioning of national regulatory agencies in times of increasing international 
cooperation. These theoretical and empirical considerations have given rise to the 
following research question for this paper: 
‘’ How does the increasing trend of regulatory internationalization and pressures 
resulting from the financial crisis affect the reputation management of the Dutch 
Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) towards the regulated industry? ‘’ 
In the following chapters, I will analyze whether the financial crisis and growth in 
transnational networks have changed the reputation management of the AFM. As I 
explain in my theoretical framework, I will assume that the AFM uses communication to 
build its reputation. In addition, I intend to discuss how the industry itself has perceived 
the reputation of the AFM during this period. As such, my research also offers an 
analysis of how a regulatory agency attempts to bridge the gap between an 
organization’s desired image and its actual reputation within the industry.  
 
1.4 Overview of paper 
This paper is divided into different chapters. In the next chapter, I will briefly explain the 
context of this research and discuss the relationship of the AFM with the regulated 
industry and how it participates in transnational networks. Afterwards, the existing 
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body of literature on reputational considerations in financial regulation will be 
discussed. I will argue that three aspects related to the reputation of a regulatory agency 
have remained underexposed in academic research thus far: 1) to what extent an agency 
is capable of forming its domestic reputation 2) the impact of financial crises on the 
reputation of agencies and 3) the consequences of the growth in transnational 
regulatory networks for the relationship between domestic regulator and industry and 
the reputation of the former. I will then introduce the theoretical framework of this 
paper that culminates in several theoretical expectations of the reputation management 
of the AFM towards the regulated industry.  
After this discussion of the research context, literature and the theoretical framework, I 
move to the empirical analysis. In the chapter on research design, I elaborate on how 
exactly I conducted this research and what sources of data I used. The empirical analysis 
itself consists of two parts. The first part is dedicated to a quantitative content analysis 
of eighty-seven speeches made by AFM board members. Here I focus on the 
communication of the AFM over the years 2006 to 2016 towards the industry. In the 
second empirical section, the qualitative part, I present the findings of seven interviews 
with experts and representatives of the regulated industry. This analysis presents the 
image of the AFM amongst firms in the industry and aims to answer those questions that 
remained after the content analysis. My paper will conclude by answering the research 
question and a brief discussion which includes a reflection of my research choices and 
the implications for future research.  
The speeches and interview transcripts are available upon request.  
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
Why choose the field of financial regulation and what defines the organization of the 
AFM? In this chapter I will discuss the research context of my case study. First, I will 
zoom in on financial regulation and explain why this is an interesting field to explore the 
importance of reputation. Second, I will discuss the specifics of the Dutch financial 
regulatory sector by focusing on the characteristics of the so-called Twin Peaks system. 
Then, the organization of the AFM will be reviewed as I focus particularly on the 
relationship of the AFM with the industry. I conclude by highlighting the most important 
contextual factors for my research.  
 
2.2 Financial regulation 
What makes the financial regulation sector an interesting field in which to explore the 
importance of reputational considerations? As I will illustrate in the review of the 
academic literature on regulatory agencies in the next chapter, reputation matters in 
regulation, but first I will briefly focus more specifically on financial regulation. One of 
the major reasons that makes the financial regulation sector an interesting testing 
ground for my theoretical assumptions regarding reputation, is the Great Recession that 
started in 2008 with the demise of the Lehman Brothers bank in the United States of 
America. Numerous authors (see Levine; 2012 or Caprio et al; 2014 for example) regard 
this financial crisis as a pivotal turning point in the field of financial regulation. Before 
the crisis, those studying public administration and economics already realized that the 
international dimension of regulation ‘’was no longer a marginal add-on to the domestic 
regime, as it has long been seen in the United States: it is now the central question in 
financial markets today’’ (Davies & Green, 2008: 6). The widespread effects of the global 
financial crisis focused even more attention on the role of transnational financial 
regulatory networks. In the introduction to his review article The Politics of Financial 
Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics, Adam Levitin (2014) summarizes 
how trust in the financial sector has become one of the major areas of research amongst 
 7 
 
academics, which makes the apparent lack of attention for reputational concerns in the 
context of regulatory agencies even more surprising; 
‘’ The question of faith in the system also underlies and permeates virtually the entire 
literature about the financial crisis, as shown by titles such as In Fed We Trust and 
Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation. In the five years since 
the crisis, a small literature has emerged on its causes, the government response, and 
potential reforms. Much of this literature has been in the form of journalistic accounts of 
either the run-up to the crisis or the government response to the crisis, sometimes with 
concluding policy proposals. More recently, we have begun to see academic 
examinations and insider accounts ‘’ (Levitin, 2014: 1993).   
In the context of financial regulation, the concept of reputation has slowly begun to gain 
more academic consideration.  When it comes to the reputation of financial regulatory 
agencies themselves, the financial crisis has mainly led to a great deal of criticism of 
their role and performance. Emphasizing the need for accountability and overseeing the 
work of regulators, Caprio (2013) concludes his critical review of the international 
consensus on financial regulation with the following words;  
‘’ That is precisely why a sentinel, meaning some oversight of regulators, is so important, 
as it would at least tip the scales a bit less against consumers and taxpayers in the battle 
over regulation by exposing the action of regulators. We have tried regulation without 
accountability and oversight and seen its sorry results. Is it not now time for a change? ’’ 
(Caprio, 2013: 38).  
A strong reputation protects agencies to a large extent against this increased line of 
criticism amongst scholars of regulation.  
 
2.3 Financial regulation in the Netherlands 
Before the end of the 1990s, the regulation of the Dutch financial sector was ensured 
through a traditional sectoral framework. In this form, supervision of the sector was 
spread amongst different organizations and as such it came under pressure due to 
doubts concerning its effectivity. In a paper for the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), Prast & 
van Lelyveld (2004) describe how the institutional design of financial supervision in the 
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Netherlands has evolved over the past decades and nowadays stands out 
internationally. They argue that it was mostly changes in the financial structure, rather 
than financial scandals, that stimulated the Dutch authorities to choose a new 
institutional supervisory framework (Prast & van Lelyveld, 2004: 3). In other countries, 
such as Sweden and the United States, changes were made in the architecture of 
financial supervision due to large banking scandals. The result was that, in those cases, 
the reputation of the national financial supervisor was seriously harmed and as such the 
establishment of new institutions was used to restore public confidence in the function 
of the financial system. In the Netherlands however, it was not so much the (good) 
reputation of the central bank as financial supervisor that required changes, but – as 
argued – concerns about efficiency.  
In the Netherlands, reforms were introduced in the late 1990s and the financial sector is 
nowadays regulated through the use of a so-called Twin Peaks Model; 
‘’ A simple objectives based setup, with the DNB permutated into a single supervisor 
responsible for the prudential stability of all financial institutions (so called micro 
prudential) as well as for stability of the financial system (so called macro prudential) 
and a new supervisor, the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) responsible for the 
conduct of business supervision of all financial firms. The securities regulator was 
developed into the AFM, while the insurance and pensions supervisor was abolished 
with large part of its organisation merged with DNB ’’ (Kremers & Schoenmaker, 2010: 
1-2).  
As said, the Twin Peaks model enjoys a favourable reputation in the international field of 
financial regulation. France and Belgium have followed the example of the Netherlands 
and introduced the Twin Peaks model in their countries. Spain, Italy and Portugal enjoy 
a framework similar to this model (Kremers & Schoenmaker, 2010: 9). As such, the 
Netherlands forms an interesting case in which to explore the importance of 
reputational considerations in the financial sector.  
Whereas the Twin Peaks model in the Netherlands in itself still enjoys a good reputation 
amongst fellow national regulators, the two main actors within this system – the DNB 
and AFM – have endured a fair amount of criticism from domestic actors in recent years. 
Two Dutch reports, the parliamentary De Wit (2010) report about the causes of the 
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financial crisis and the Scheltema (2010) report about the failure of the DSB Bank, were 
critical of the role of financial regulators in the Netherlands during this crisis. The 
parliamentary De Wit Committee of 2010 reviewed the role of Dutch financial 
supervisors during the financial crisis and concluded that both the DNB and the AFM 
had fallen short of successfully supervising the financial system. In the Scheltema report 
(2010) it was argued that the DSB Bank should not have been able to acquire a banking 
license in 2005 and that when it eventually was granted one, the DNB did not 
sufficiently supervise the bank. Both reports led to national, wide-spread and critical 
attention to the role of the DNB and AFM. Thus, we assume differences in the form and 
importance of reputation for the Dutch financial regulators before, during and after the 
global financial crisis.  
 
2.4 The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets 
The Autoriteit Financiële Markten, the AFM, was set up in 2002 as successor to the 
Securities Board of the Netherlands. The reason for this change in organizational 
structure was the large number of additional tasks that the AFM would take on in years 
to follow due to legislative agreements (see the Dutch government memorandum 
Herziening van het toezicht op de Financiële Marktsector). Its head office is in Amsterdam 
and the number of employees ranges from 500 to 600 with a yearly budget of around 85 
million euros. Trust is one of the keywords within the AFM organization. The main goal 
and task of the agency is to ensure - through supervision - that parties will retain their 
trust in the functioning of the financial markets. This trust is of fundamental importance: 
without enough trust in the financial system, the (inter)national economy will not be 
able to function. This means that ‘’ the AFM supervises conduct in the entire financial 
market sector: savings, investing, insurance and lending. The AFM’s conduct supervision 
is designed to contribute to the proper functioning of the financial markets’’ (AFM 
website, 2017). In recent years, the AFM has received a fair bit of criticism because of its 
functioning and position within the Twin Peaks system: aspects I will discuss in greater 
depth in the chapter on research design.    
The Dutch minister of Finance is politically responsible for the functioning of the AFM. 
The agency however enjoys a great amount of autonomy and can be seen as a quasi-
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autonomous non-governmental organization (QUANGO). The AFM operates with a great 
deal of freedom and in a setting of indirect responsibility (no direct control or 
supervision) in which the Dutch minister of Finance does have the power to assign or 
fire board members.  Important judicial agreements that the AFM has to consider in 
their line of work are the law on Financial Supervision and the law on the Supervision of 
Accountants.  The AFM has a direct mandate to impose sanctions if market parties do 
not behave accordingly: these sanctions comprise official warnings, instructions, fines 
and penalties (including a publication explaining the reasons behind the sanctions in a 
national newspaper: so-called naming and shaming).  
The AFM has a supervisory board that oversees the functioning of the executive board. 
The executive board usually has three to five board members who are responsible for 
different aspects of their financial supervision. For example, in the current board of 
three people chairwoman Merel van Vroonhoven is responsible for compliance and 
integrity whilst board member Gerben Everts is responsible for asset management and 
accountant organizations.  
Years Chairman of the AFM 
2002-2007 Arthur Docters van Leeuwen 
2007-2011 Hans Hoogervorst 
2011-2013 Ronald Gerritse 
2014- now Merel van Vroonhoven 
Table 1. Chairpersons of the AFM.  
I will discuss my choice for the AFM (instead of the DNB for example) as case study to a 
greater extent in the chapter on research design later on in this paper.  
 
2.5 The AFM and the regulated industry 
As I focus on the ties between the AFM and the regulated industry, it seems only logical 
to zoom in on what exactly constitutes their relationship.  
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Regulation of the AFM comes in different forms. As discussed above, the AFM has a 
direct mandate to enforce sanctions if market parties do not behave accordingly: these 
sanctions include official warnings, instructions, fines and penalties. But their work is 
also about the setting of standards and gathering of information. I will come back to 
these aspects during my discussion of the theoretical framework later on in this paper.  
Which industries does the AFM regulate? The AFM is responsible for the conduct of 
business supervision of all financial firms. An important organizational form within the 
AFM is its network of external stakeholders: this formal network includes strategic 
consultation sessions, consultations with stakeholders and expert meetings. In this 
network, the AFM regularly consults the regulated industry of which the Advisory Panel 
of Representative Organizations meets at least twice a year to raise questions and give 
advice about the AFM's annual plan, budget and levies, and its annual report and 
accounts. The members of this panel come from organizations representing parties with 
a stake in AFM supervision and as such the panel gives a good impression of the 
different types of firms in the industry.  
Adfiz Dutch Banking Association Insurance Association 
(VvV) 
Association of Proprietary 
Traders (APT) 
Dutch Accounting 
Association 
Association for Effect 
Owners (VEB) 
Consumers Association NYSE Euronext Association for Home 
Owners (VEH) 
Dutch Fund and Asset 
Management Association 
Pension Federation Dutch Association for 
Finance Firms (VFN) 
Eumedion Register accountants 
Association (SRA) 
Association for Equity 
Managers  
Table 2. Members of the Advisory Panel of Representative Organizations 
An important thing to emphasize in the relationship between the AFM and the industry 
is that it is the latter that bears the costs for the existence of the former. As of the first of 
January 2015, the contribution of the government of almost 43 million euros to the costs 
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of financial supervision was also taken away and now the total cost for the existence of 
the AFM is borne by the industry. 
 
2.6 International networks of the AFM  
The financial crises proved to be a catalyst for the increase in transnational cooperation 
in financial regulation. International networks have thus become a fundamental part of 
the work of the AFM. On their website, the AFM explains that; 
‘’ The international aspects of its work are very important to the Dutch Authority for the 
Financial Markets (AFM). Most of the legislation concerning financial supervision is the 
result of choices made at not only European but also global level. The AFM tries to 
ensure that it is permanently represented in both European and global cooperative 
bodies that address issues relating to the supervision of conduct on the financial 
markets. International contacts are also essential for ongoing supervisory tasks ’’ (AFM 
website, 2017).  
Within the European Union, the AFM takes part in the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). The ESMA is both an advisory body for the European Commission 
and a cooperative body for the different national securities regulators involved. The 
AFM also participates in working groups within the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the Joint 
Committee of the three ESAs. Moreover, the AFM participates in the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB). There are countless expert and operational groups active within 
these European Authorities in which the AFM participates. At the global level, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is the most important 
organization for the AFM as it is one of the thirty-four members of IOSCO's Board.  
I will explain in greater detail what I expect to be the impact of the participation in these 
networks for the domestic reputation of the AFM in my theoretical framework, but it is 
worth emphasizing in this chapter that most of the legislation concerning financial 
supervision is the result of choices made at not only the European but also at the global 
level. This means an important change in the context in which the AFM operates: 
compared to a decade ago, many more decisions concerning the financial supervision of 
 13 
 
the AFM are made in consultation with sometimes dozens of other national regulators. 
One can only expect that this has impact on the reputation of the AFM within the 
regulated industry at home.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This brief discussion of the context of my research has highlighted different things. First, 
the financial sector seems to be a dynamic field of regulation in which reputation has 
been an area of contest. Second, the regulatory system in the Netherlands, the Twin 
Peaks model, is often discussed as an example for other countries. This makes it an ideal 
object of research into the reputation of regulatory agencies. Third, within this Dutch 
system, the AFM has suffered a lot of criticism. Are two separate organizations really 
necessary for successful financial supervision? Reputation could prove important in 
consolidating the position of the AFM. Lastly, financial crises have accelerated the pace 
at which transnational networks have developed in the last decade. These networks 
have fundamentally changed decision-making processes and thus the role of an agency 
in the regulatory system: all important factors in the reputation of a public organization.  
The context of this research seems promising. I now move to a review of the academic 
literature on reputational concerns for public organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous review of the research context and explanation of the role and functioning 
of the AFM in the financial regulatory system has illustrated that the reputation of this 
Dutch agency has met some challenges in recent years. But for a regulatory agency does 
reputation really even matter? And if so, why and how? Fortunately, these are questions 
that have been discussed before in the academic world. But as I will argue, towards the 
end of this section, a number of questions remain to be answered.  
In this chapter I will review the existing literature on this subject. First, different 
conceptualizations of the notion that is reputation will be presented. The goal in this 
first part is to illustrate why reputation for an agency is important. Having discussed the 
importance of reputation and how it is built up, the next question concerns whether or 
not an agency is able to manage its reputation. Then, I will discuss in greater depth in 
what ways reputation is built by focusing on two key concepts: action and 
communication by an agency. The final part of this section discusses the literature 
concerning the impact of the growth in transnational networks and financial crisis on 
reputation. I conclude this review with focus on those aspects which have remained 
largely overlooked in academic literature. 
 
3.2 The reputation of an agency: what is it and does it really matter? 
It probably comes as no surprise that reputation has actually always received a fair 
amount of attention from academic scholars. Reputational concerns have also, although 
sometimes indirectly, been discussed over the years in the academic literature on 
politics and public administration. In 1970, political scientist Robert Jervis had already 
discussed images and state power in his book The Logic of Images in International 
Relations. The works of authors such as Quirk (1980), Rourke (1984), Heiman (1997) 
and Whitford (2002) further contributed to the study of bureaucratic reputation.  
A more systematic theoretical and empirical focus on the concept emerged at the end of 
the twenty-first century. An important strand of literature had finally begun to 
concentrate specifically on the importance of reputational concerns as a driving force 
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behind the behavior of national (regulatory) agencies. To a large extent, this research on 
bureaucratic reputation has emerged as a ‘’challenge to the assumption of institutional-
choice theory that, in the absence of exogenous political control, bureaucrats will exploit 
their office in pursuit of their narrow self-interests’’ (Gilad et al, 2013: 4). According to 
this view, bureaucrats are actually responsive to external pressures as they try to 
maximize overall support for their work and minimize negative feedback (see for 
example Wood & Waterman, 1991 or Olson, 1996). This explains why reputation was 
seen as important: if bureaucrats are indeed responsive to external pressures, their 
reputation amongst audiences matters.  
The notion of reputation can easily be confused with related concepts such as image or 
status. Therefore, it is important to review different definitions of reputation to 
illustrate the difference between these notions. Research into corporate reputation 
distinguishes three perspectives on reputation; the economics, social constructivist, and 
institutional perspectives (Rindova & Martins, 2012: 75). For an extensive review of 
these perspectives, I refer to the work of Rindova and Martins (2012) or Maor and 
Wæraas (2014), but for the sake of clarifying the definition of reputation that will be 
used in this research it is important to note that two main research traditions have 
emerged concerning public organizations that are largely based on these perspectives.  
The first body of work (with authors including Carpenter and Maor) is based on the 
political science approach and it ‘’focuses empirically on executive agencies and their 
standing within a political-administrative system. The theoretical premise of studies 
within this tradition is that governmental agencies are generally rational and politically 
conscious organizations’’ (Maor & Wæraas, 2014: 12). Carpenter, who uses historical 
analysis, quantitative empirical studies and formal modeling as his main methods for 
research, deﬁnes organizational reputation as ‘’a set of beliefs about an organization’s 
capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple 
audiences (..) the way in which organizational reputations are formed and subsequently 
cultivated is fundamental to understanding the role of public administration in a 
democracy’’ (Carpenter & Krause, 2012: 26). Two concepts are crucial to Carpenter in 
his understanding and study of reputation: different forms of reputation (moral, 
procedural, technical and performative) and the different audiences an organization 
faces. I will discuss these notions further on in this paper.  
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Carpenter is not the only academic in the political science tradition who has increased 
his focus on the importance of reputational matters. Arild Wæraas and Moshe Maor 
(2014) for example have also done considerable work as their discussion of 
bureaucratic reputation within the field of political science in their book Organizational 
Reputation in the Public Sector shows. These authors characterize the concept according 
to four different attributes; 
‘’(..) the specific view of reputation which enables an agency that possesses it to make a 
claim or unique contribution to the public good; the multifaceted nature of reputation; 
the existence of multiple expectations by multiple audiences, and the context of today’s 
knowledge society and blame culture which foster conditions that intensify agency 
concerns with reputational risk. ‘’ (Maor & Wæraas, 2014: 41).  
Maor and Wæraas also emphasize different forms of reputation (the multifaceted nature 
of reputation) and the various audiences towards which the work of an organization is 
geared (multiple expectations by multiple audiences). Their other two attributes, 
concerning the contribution to the public good and today’s knowledge society, are 
however also valuable insights that I will return to in the next sections.  
The second body of work (led by researchers such as Byrkjeflot and Luoma-Aho) is 
based on the organizational approach to reputation. Instead of ‘’focusing on specific 
attributes of reputation, the research within this tradition emphasizes the general 
standing of public organizations and the overall socially constructed and aggregate 
nature of reputation. Consequently, the rationality and degrees of freedom of the 
individual organization in controlling its own reputation are downplayed’’ (Maor & 
Wæraas, 2014: 15). Luamo-Aho (2008) for example explains reputation in the following 
way; 
‘’Reputation consists of different characteristics: Fombrun (1996) names credibility, 
reliability, responsibility, and trustworthiness to be the most important ones. 
Reputation is more related to deeds than its sister concept image which refers to 
impressions; organizational reputation is simply the sum of stories told about the 
organization among the stakeholders’’ (Luamo-Aho, 2008: 449). 
This organizational approach includes all kinds of administrative units in the public 
sector.  Examples of these case studies are research into public health care units 
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(Byrkjeflot & Angell; 2007 and Luoma-Aho; 2013) or local government units (Nielsen & 
Salomonsen; 2012 and Kuoppakangas et al; 2013). 
Considering these different approaches, it is also important to differentiate between the 
various organizations. The public sector is of course different from the private sector. 
These distinctions are important in order to specify the characteristics of a public 
organization such as the AFM and understand how reputation fits within this context. 
Luamo-Aho and Canel (2016) list several important differences. First, public sector 
organizations mean politics. So, structures are more complex and objectives and 
decision-making criteria more uncertain. Secondly, public sector organizations are 
constrained by legal and regulatory frameworks. A high degree of accountability is 
crucial and they are more subject to public scrutiny. Lastly, there are more and more 
diverse publics and stakeholders involved with public sector organizations than with 
private sector firms. As Van der Hart (1990) already established several decades ago, 
the privatization of many government agencies following the wave of New Public 
Management has only strengthened these complexities (Van der Hart, 1990: 38). So 
overall, public sector organizations have to ‘’ operate under different constraints and 
balance political guidelines, national guidelines, international cooperation, ideologies, 
the bureaucratic culture of administration, and citizen and customer feedback’’ (Luoma-
Aho & Jose Canel, 2016: 598).   
Having laid out different concepts of reputation and specifying the context within which 
reputation matters for public organizations such as the AFM, I now move to explaining 
specifically why reputation is important for regulatory agencies. As Maor & Wæraas 
state in the foreword of their book on organizational reputation in the public sector, a 
‘’favorable reputation is an asset of importance that no public sector entity can afford to 
neglect because it gives power, autonomy and access to critical resources’’ (Maor & 
Wæraas, 2015: 3).  Moreover, reputation is about the survival of an organization. 
Daniel Carpenter (2013) sees regulatory capture as one of the most dominant narratives 
in the research on regulation and reputation. It is also an important discussion within 
our research as the object of our case-study, the AFM, is an agency involved in financial 
regulation.  An interesting point Carpenter makes is that popular opinion often sees 
regulatory capture as the culprit when regulations seem to detract from the common 
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good. Discussing the financial crisis and its effects in the United States, Carpenter & Moss 
(2013) argue that; 
‘’ The banking industry achieved the practical equivalent of capture, with federal 
regulatory agencies generally adopting its favored positions. Although several signs of 
traditional capture were present – notably a well-oiled revolving door between 
regulatory agencies and industry – the argument for capture in the strict sense is 
weakened by a plausible alternative explanation: that agency officials were genuinely 
persuaded by the argument that free financial markets were good for the public’’ 
(Carpenter & Moss, 2013: 93).  
The question, or rather the discussion, Carpenter & Moss bring forward is whether 
regulatory agencies really were captured by firms in the banking industry or that they 
acted from a genuine belief in fewer regulations for financial markets. Why is this 
important in the context of reputation? Because the financial crisis has made regulatory 
agencies – not only in the United States but also in Europe – very conscious of concerns 
that have been captured by the interest of the industry they are supposed to regulate. 
This leads me to expect that they will have made serious efforts to change their 
reputation towards the industry: no longer will there be well-oiled revolving doors 
between regulatory agencies and the industry and freedom for financial parties to act as 
they like. Rather, one can expect regulators to have become stricter in their role as 
financial supervisors. It is then interesting to see whether the industry has indeed 
perceived that regulators have become stricter and ‘less open for capture’.  
In addition to the relationship of a regulator with the regulated industry in the context of 
regulatory capture, reputation is also important for a regulatory agency because of its 
ties with other audiences: those groups that provide an agency with resources and 
raison d'être in general. Carpenter (2010) argues that ‘’the more legitimate, expert and 
effective a regulator is perceived to be, the more likely politicians will be (..) to vest 
significant authority and resources in the regulator’’ (Carpenter, 2010: 54). Verhoest, 
Rommel and Boon (2015) have for example focused on the relationship between an 
agency (the Flemish electricity and gas regulator) and its political principle providing 
the organization with resources and authority (the Flemish Minister of Energy) and 
tried to explain in what way reputation influences the political autonomy of this 
particular agency. These authors concluded that the agency relied on reputation as a 
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trust-building mechanism and that this resulted in more de facto policy autonomy and 
deeper forms of collaboration (Verhoest et al; 2015 in Maor & Wæraas, 2015: 231). This 
angle of research therefore tries to show that reputation can provide agencies with 
political leverage that gives them authority and autonomy as resources: the key to their 
survival.  
To sum up this section, definitions may vary in what the exactly emphasize or include in 
their conceptualization, but there seems to be consensus that organizational reputation 
refers to the general perception of a given organization across its stakeholders over 
time. It has also proven to be important as a favorable reputation gives power, 
autonomy, access to resources and eventually probably guarantees the survival of an 
agency. Let us now turn to the management of reputation.  
 
3.3 Reputation management 
Overall, reputation is defined in several ways and certainly seems important for the 
functioning of regulatory agencies. When one considers this presumed importance of 
reputation for an agency as argued above, a major question arises whether an agency is 
actually capable of managing its reputation. If this is the case, one should ask, how?  
Wæraas  and Byrkjeflot (2012) discuss five problems that most public organizations will 
face when adopting reputation management. Their work is a good starting point to 
understand how reputation management works and what mechanisms lie behind the 
concept. As they explain, reputation management involves ‘’bridging the gap between a 
desired and an actual image of the organization ‘’ (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012: 190). 
Referring to the work of Argenti (1998), Argenti and Forman (2002) and Doorley and 
Garcia (2007) the authors explain that, within reputation management, three steps are 
recurring themes: the formulation of strategy, self-presentation, and measurement 
(Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012: 190-193).  With this three-step cycle, organizations try to 
manage their reputation. I will briefly discuss each step as the concept will return in the 
theoretical framework later on in this paper.  
The formulation of a general strategy is usually the first-step in the reputation 
management process. This first step includes a consideration of what the organization 
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actually stands for: the organization engages in a ‘‘process of discovery designed to 
unearth the beating heart of the company—what the organization stands for at its core, 
what it really is’’ (van Riel and Fombrun: 2007 cited in Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012: 191). 
This process of discovery should accumulate in a reputation strategy that forms the 
basis for all reputation management efforts.  
The second step is the actual influencing of the opinions of audiences. The main goal in 
this step is to bring the identity (that was formulated in the first step) closer towards the 
image of the organization amongst different audiences. For this, messages are crucial (as 
we will discuss in the next section). So, what are the best messages to direct the image of 
an agency towards its desired reputation? Van Riel and Fombrun (2007) explain that the 
best messages are those that ‘’enhance the organization’s visibility, consistency, 
authenticity, transparency, distinctiveness, and responsiveness. If successfully done, 
organizational identity is aligned with image, and the organization will be an object of 
trust, admiration, esteem and respect, ultimately producing the emotional bond between 
them and the external audiences that is necessary for the development of a strong 
reputation’’ (van Riel and Fombrun: 2007 cited in Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012: 192). 
The third step is measuring the perception of audiences. On the basis of the results of 
this evaluation, a new strategy can be formulated to once more work to reduce the gap 
between the supposed identity of the organization and their image. These evaluations 
are often developed in the form of surveys, focus groups or regular meetings with a 
particular audience. With larger and more public organizations such as the AFM, the 
media and political institutions can also be seen as platforms for evaluation. Wæraas  
and Byrkjeflot see five problems within this three-step cycle. These five problems, that 
each demand further research to uncover their implications, will be discussed in depth 
in our theoretical framework as they are particularly relevant to my research of the 
reputation management of the AFM.  
Are there examples of empirical research that illustrate the mechanisms behind 
reputation management in a regulation context? Previous empirical work has, for 
example, shown that regulatory agencies respond to the expressions of opinion on their 
work from different audiences. Empirical research carried out by Sharon Gilad, Moshe 
Maor and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom (2015) analyzed the Israeli banking regulator’s 
responses to public expressions of opinion between 1996 and 2012. Gilad et al. show 
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that the actions of an agency can differ depending on how it judges the effect on an 
allegation (the regulator being either too lenient or excessive) for its reputation. They 
also suggest that ‘’external audiences may be able to shape agency attention and 
response by carefully framing their claims in light of their understandings of agencies’ 
distinct reputational vulnerabilities ‘’ (Gilad et al, 2013: 23). Their research shows how a 
regulatory agency can change their behavior if it fears damage to its reputation.   
Gilad and Yogev (2012) also argue that reputation plays a key role in regulatory 
processes and decisions. They based their conclusions on a case study of the British 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) in which they explored the interaction of the FOS 
with different audiences such as financial firms and politicians. One of their most 
interesting findings is that regulators’ international systems of control, such as that of 
the FOS, may be designed to counter threats to the reputation of the agency (Gilad and 
Yogev, 2012: 329-331). As such, they emphasize that enhancing an agency’s reputation 
is not limited to public relation offices and contact with journalists: it is also about 
international performance management that aims to safeguard their identity and 
reputation. Gilad and Yogev conclude by arguing that ‘’regulation is continuously being 
shaped and reshaped in light of the reputation risks that regulators face in their 
interactions with multiple stakeholders. Regulators’ reputation-management strategies 
are therefore an important driver of regulatory policy and its implementation ‘’ (Gilad 
and Yogev, 2012: 334).  
Leaver (2002) distils from his research on regulatory capture that, because regulators 
fear the possibility that firms may complain publicly about tough regulatory decisions 
that will affect the reputation of the agency, the regulated industry will actually gain 
more room to maneuver. His research originates in 2002, so his findings (especially 
concerning financial regulation) might have altered by 2017. Bo et al (2006) make a 
connection between the length of regulatory positions as a proxy for relative stability to 
fears about the market-value of regulators reputation. Their expectation is that longer-
term regulators will be less concerned about their reputation.  
So, it seems that, based on the above, there are possibilities for managing the reputation 
of a public organization. What should then be the goal of reputation management? One 
might expect that an organization such as the AFM should be striving for an excellent 
reputation. Vilma Luoma-Aho (2007; 2008) however thinks otherwise. After studying 
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the reputation of twelve Finnish public sector organizations among their stakeholders, 
Luoma-Aho proposes that for public sectors organizations it is actually desirable to have 
a neutral rather an excellent reputation. Her reasoning is that ‘’ neutrality enables a 
critical operating distance, and the resources for maintaining an excellent reputation are 
scarce’’ (Luamo-Aho, 2007: 124). As such, Luoma-Aho proposes a new ideal for the 
reputation of public sector organizations. Her ideas demand more explanation, as they 
are important in understanding why and how an agency such as the AFM would try to 
form its reputation: an organization aiming for a neutral reputation will manage its 
reputation differently from one that strives for excellence. 
Luamo-Aho builds her argument on the work of other authors such as that of Boorstin 
(1975) on neutral corporate images and Sztompka (2000) or Ojala et al. (2006) who 
emphasize the burdens of an excellent reputation for a (private) organization. First, she 
argues that an excellent reputation is risky. If the reputation of an agency is higher, it 
can only fall harder as something unexpected happens, such as changes in the law or in 
their funding that could limit them in their actions. Moreover, for public sector 
organizations it is important to have trust no matter what the situation is. Luamo-Aho 
also explains that ‘’excellent reputations require constant cultivation’’ (Luamo-Aho, 
2007: 129). Because public funds are scarce this cultivation of reputation is rarely the 
top priority for public sector organizations. She therefore argues that ‘’ the target level of 
reputation should be a realistic and healthy one, that is, it should be high enough for the 
organization to be trusted and taken seriously, but neutral or even low enough to 
acquire the necessary operating distance necessary especially in times of crisis ‘’ 
(Luamo-Aho, 2007: 130). It is important to note that Luamo-Aho refers to reputation as 
the general image of an agency among stakeholders leading to trust instead of some 
assessment of performance against expectations.  
As such, an excellent reputation might be desirable, but the most important goal for 
public sector organizations seems to be the maintenance of trust in their organization, 
as it is the fundament of their existence. So rather than aiming for excellence, agencies 
aim for a neutral reputation that produces enduring trust in their organization. The 
work of Luoma-Aho has created a new way of thinking about the reputation of a 
regulatory agency. Indeed, Luoma-Aho emphasizes throughout her work that ‘’an era of 
understanding the benefits of reputation in the public sector can be said to have begun’’ 
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(Luamo-Aho, 2007: 136). In order to reap the benefits of reputation in the public sector 
however, one has to first build such an image. In this effort, the actions and 
communication of an agency are particularly important.  
 
3.4 Action and communication in building the reputation of an agency 
In the literature on reputation, two aspects of reputation management are seen to be 
especially important: the actions and the communication of an agency. Both concepts 
have an impact on the reputation of an agency, but in different ways, as I shall illustrate 
in this section by reviewing the literature on this particular subject. In this section, it 
might also be noteworthy to remind the reader that in my research I focus solely on the 
communication of the AFM when it comes to its ‘supply side’. I will however also discuss 
the actions of the AFM in my research into the ‘demand side’ of the regulated industry.   
Popular management literature has written extensively on what the impact is of action 
and communication. Within public organization studies and the literature on reputation, 
the concepts have been discussed less. If we use the three-step cycle of Wæraas & 
Byrkjeflot as our point of reference, action and communication involve the second step 
in the cycle: moving the identity (that was formulated in the first step) closer towards 
the image of the organization as perceived by an audience.  
Key to the reputation of an agency is probably primarily its actions. As Carpenter (2010) 
already argues, the ‘’ actions of government entities, especially the more visible and 
controversial ones, will feed back to shape the reputations that empower and constrain 
them ‘’ (Carpenter, 2010: 35). A large part of actions and their effect on reputation 
depends on the expectations of different stakeholders. If predictions are disappointed, 
new images will emerge about an agency that might replace any more positive older 
ones (Carpenter, 2010: 35). As Luoma-Ahoa, Olkkonena and Lähteenmäki (2013) 
propose, it is more beneficial to study the expectations of stakeholders than their 
experiences, as expectations affect their future satisfaction. As such, actions can be seen 
as a carefully constructed balance between the actual content of actions and how they 
meet the expectations of different audiences. This relates to the question of whether or 
not an agency should be aiming for an excellent reputation or a neutral one: which of the 
two will benefit the organization the most?  
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Actions and expectations are also of course about context. Academics therefore also 
argue that communication is vital for regulatory agencies and their reputation. Public 
sector organizations globally tend to have a ‘’reputation for excessive bureaucracy and 
inefficiency of operation’’ (Luamo-Aho & Canel, 2016: 600). Explaining why such 
excessive bureaucracy is necessary and that the means of operation of an agency are 
indeed efficient requires solid communication strategies: agencies need to explain both 
their actions and the thinking that underlies those actions. Maor, Gilad and Ben-Nun 
Bloom (2015) focused on the strategic use of communication of agencies to manage 
their reputations and saw their work as a ‘’ first step toward filling this lacuna in the 
literature, as this study considers the distinct reputation of the agency as a basis for its 
communication as a part of an overall reputation-management strategy ‘’ (Maor, Gilad 
and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015: 581). Maor et al argue that if an agency has a good 
reputation amongst its audiences, it can permit itself to remain silent on certain issues: 
criticism will probably not affect their reputation. On the other hand, if an agency has a 
weak image, it will respond heavily to hints of criticism as they work to protect their 
fragile reputation (Maor, Gilad and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015: 584).  
According to Maor et al, other research thus far has not paid explicit attention to 
communications and reputational concerns for public agencies. Returning to the four 
characteristics that Wæraas and Maor (2014) outline in their definition of reputation, it 
is therefore interesting to elaborate on their last attribute regarding ‘today’s knowledge 
society’ in this part of the paper regarding communication. Compared to earlier periods 
in our history, it is relatively easy for different external actors to judge the behavior of 
an agency. This is largely due to an increase in the supply of information: digitalization 
and public pressures regarding the transparency of (semi)governmental agencies have 
increased even more since the financial crisis. This makes it more difficult for regulatory 
agencies to cultivate their reputation, as they cannot control what information about 
their organization reaches external parties. Communication then becomes crucial. This 
makes it even more worthwhile to contribute to the understanding of the role of 
communication in reputation management with new research.  
 
 
 25 
 
3.5 Internationalization of regulation and the reputation of an agency 
As argued above, action and communication are dependent on the context in which 
agencies operate. This context has significantly changed as in recent years we have 
witnessed a rapid growth in transnational networks engaged in financial regulation. As 
such, we have witnessed a move in decision-making from domestic bureaucracies to 
international platforms. Especially in sectors that involve issues that do not limit 
themselves to national borders, these networks offer possibilities to tackle problems 
that are relevant for regulators in different countries (Verdier, 2009: 138).  There are 
different aspects that can help us to explain the behavior of national agencies in 
transnational networks, such as the role of transaction costs (North, 1996; Williamson, 
1999; Estache & Martimort, 1999) or bureaucratic autonomy (Gilardi, 2005; Pollit, 2004; 
Ruffing, 2015).  
One would expect (as I will argue in my theoretical framework) that such a shift in the 
domestic capabilities of regulatory agencies has had an impact on their domestic 
reputation. How can we link the domestic reputation of a regulator to its participation in 
transnational networks? Surprisingly, very few researchers have much paid attention to 
this fairly novel aspect of agency reputation. 
The link between domestic politics and the behavior of an agency in transnational 
networks has however been the subject of research in previous work. In a case study of 
the Basel Committee, International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and 
International Competition Network (ICN), Pierre-Hugues Verdier (2009) for example 
concludes that ‘’far from being removed from domestic politics, regulators are tied to 
them by multiple channels of accountability and incentives structures that generally 
outweigh their loyalty to global interests’’ (Verdier, 2009: 162). Emphasizing the 
continuing importance of their accountability to different audiences, the domestic 
reputation can be an important consideration when an agency participates in a 
transnational regulatory network. 
Provan and Kenis (2007) also put emphasis on domestic governance and transnational 
network tensions. Of these tensions, the one between internal and external legitimacy is 
the most interesting for our theoretical argument. Human and Provan (2000) have 
provided the majority of the work on this particular issue, explaining that ‘’on the one 
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hand, a key concern for any governance mechanism is to develop internal legitimacy 
among participants (..) on the other hand, any form of governance must be responsive to 
external expectations ’’ (Provan & Kenis, 2007: 243). For this reason, reputation should 
therefore be an important aspect within research.  
So, it seems there is still work for academics to do in terms of connecting the growth in 
transitional networks to domestic reputation. What does the body of work on reputation 
state about major crises such as the recent financial crisis? Almost no research has 
focused directly on the impact of this particular event on the reputation of an agency, 
but previous work has made links between earlier major crises and the reputation 
management of a public organization.  
The research mentioned previously by Maor, Gilad and Ben-Nun Bloom (2015) on the 
Israeli banking sector illustrated how central banks responded in terms of their 
reputation management to changes in public opinion due to (major) crises. As discussed, 
depending on the reputation of the agency before crises, they believe an organization 
could decide to remain silent on certain issues or respond strongly to hints of criticism: 
strategic silence or regulatory talk. Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2012) explained how 
reputational concerns affected the duration of enforcement decisions within the 
American Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research. They connect the intensity of media attention (media salience) during crises 
to the speed with which the FDA takes enforcement actions out of fear for its reputation. 
If media attention is intense and the image of the agency negative, it will sooner engage 
in decisions regarding enforcement (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2012: 54).  
Other work by for example Carpenter (2001; 2002) and Krause and Douglas (2005) also 
discusses these links between a crisis, an increase in threats to the reputation of an 
agency and its behavior. The explicit link between the effects of the financial crises on 
the reputation of financial regulators however has not yet been made to my knowledge. 
This is a promising field of future research and one that I will touch upon in my own 
work on the reputation of the AFM.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
Maor and Wæraas convincingly argue that ‘’in sum, the existing body of literature on 
organizational reputation in the public sector is still in its infancy, suffering from 
theoretical fragmentation and works being written from diverging research traditions 
with few cross-references’’ (Maor & Wæraas, 2015: 19). Having reviewed the literature 
on reputation, this seems to be a justifiable conclusion.  
I have discussed the emerging literature on reputational considerations in line with four 
themes. First, the review of different conceptualizations of reputation and its 
importance for the work of regulators showed that indeed, reputation matters, but also 
that the concept has many different faces and implications that demand further 
research. This was also emphasized in the discussion on reputation management. The 
three-step cycle provides us with a valuable overview of how an agency deals with its 
reputation, but also leaves us with many questions. I will return to the five problems of 
the three-step cycle in the theoretical framework. Another important discussion 
concerns what the goal of reputation management should be: are agencies really better 
off with a neutral reputation? Again, this demands future academic attention. Action and 
communication are two of the building blocks of one’s reputation, but it is still unclear 
how these two function and impact on each other under different circumstances. I also 
signaled this lack of understanding of the specifics of reputation management in the 
almost non-existent literature regarding the effects of transnational networks and 
financial crises.  
What exact conditions effect how reputation management functions? Which problems 
does an agency face when its tries to bridge the gap between its desired reputation and 
image amongst firms in the industry? And what are the effects of major changes in the 
international regulatory landscape for the domestic reputation of an agency? These are 
questions that demand further research. As such, the following implications for my 
research can be drawn from the literature on the concept of reputation. To start with, I 
will focus on the image that the AFM presents of itself (through my analysis of their 
communication in the form of speeches) and the reputation that it enjoys amongst firms 
in the regulated industry (through my analysis of the conducted interviews). This 
section will also provide us with a better understanding of reputation management and 
the role of action and communication in building a strong image.  
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Second, I will analyze the effects of major crises and a growth in transnational networks 
on the reputation of the AFM.  This will be discussed from both points of view: how the 
AFM refers to crises and transnational networks in its communication and what the 
industry makes of the effects of the two on the image of the AFM. With this, I hope to add 
to the literature discourse on reputation.   
As Carpenter finds, ‘’ the lesson of this scholarship is that, when trying to account for a 
regulator’s behavior, look at the audience, and look at the threats ‘’ (Carpenter, 2010: 
832). This will therefore be my springboard into the next section, as I will present my 
theoretical framework and explain which exact concepts I will use in my research to 
explore the management of the domestic reputation of the AFM.  
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
4.1 Introduction 
My review of the literature on reputation has shown that there is still a lot of work to be 
done in this nascent sub-field of political science. As argued in the previous chapter, I 
will focus on three ‘gaps in the literature’ during my research: the bridging of the 
desired reputation by an agency and the image of its stakeholders, the impact of major 
global crises on reputation and the growth of decision-making in transnational networks 
on the domestic position of an agency. It is now time to present my own theoretical 
framework for the research that I have conducted on the reputation of the AFM.  
In this theoretical framework, I will discuss the following. I will start with presenting my 
own interpretation of the notion of reputation by focusing on the different forms of 
reputation and audiences that Carpenter distinguishes in his work. Then, the conceptual 
framework for the supposed reputation management of the AFM will be discussed. My 
premise is that the AFM will actively try to shape its reputation in its communication 
towards the industry in the form of the content of speeches. On the other hand, the 
industry will not only base its image of the AFM on its communication, but also on the 
actions of the agency. Therefore, in this section, I focus on three concepts that we briefly 
touched upon in the literature review: the three-step cycle, communication and action. 
In the last part of this theoretical framework, I will zoom in on the concepts behind the 
growth of transnational decision-making in financial regulation. Here, the impact of the 
financial crises will also be reviewed from a theoretical perspective. I conclude this 
chapter with several theoretical expectations that follow from our framework and 
finally some brief remarks on the entirety of this part of the paper.  
 
4.2 Defining reputation: different forms and audiences 
Various definitions of the notion reputation have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. In this paper, I will follow the definition of reputation as it was presented by 
Daniel Carpenter. The most important reason for this choice is that Carpenter his 
definition (as one from a political science approach) focuses on specific attributes of 
reputation. Carpenter has put a lot of effort into bringing more nuance to the concept of 
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reputation by focusing from a theoretical angle on the different forms of reputation and 
different audiences. I will discuss these specifics therefore in more depth as they form 
the basis for my analysis.  
Forms of reputation 
As I argued before, reputation has different characteristics. Carpenter (2010) 
distinguishes four different forms of reputation: performative reputation, moral 
reputation, procedural reputation and technical reputation (Carpenter, 2010: 46). Each 
of these forms of reputation entails different questions and contrasting audiences. 
Cultivating a strong reputation is therefore difficult as what one audience may see as 
strong behavior can be different from what another one believes. I will use the four 
forms of reputation of Carpenter to analyze the communication of the AFM in the period 
2006 to 2016 and the image amongst firms in the regulated industry. So let us take a 
closer look at the different concepts.  
Performative reputation entails the standing of an agency when it concerns its capacity 
to fulfill its main tasks and ‘’execute charges on its responsibility in a manner that is 
interpreted as competent and perhaps efficient’’ (Carpenter, 2012: 27). In this context, 
agencies are simply judged by their performance in reaching the goals as set by different 
audiences. Carpenter sees ‘’the ability to intimidate’’ as an important aspect of 
performative reputation (Carpenter, 2010: 46). Carpenter uses the example of the 
relationship between the regulators and the regulated to illustrate this aspect. For the 
regulated industry, performance of a regulatory agency is not about the capacity for 
success, but concerns the question whether ‘’ the organization can display sufficient 
vigor and aggressiveness in the pursuit of some of its aims so as to invite compliance’’ 
(Carpenter, 2010: 46). This distinction in the meaning of performative reputation 
between different audiences is an important one to consider in the context of our 
research: when I look at how the AFM tries to shape its performative reputation towards 
the industry, sufficient vigor and aggressiveness are aspects that I will be looking for in 
their message.  
A second form of reputation is moral reputation. This type of reputation concerns the 
morality and ethics of an organization and answers questions related to a culture of 
honesty and ethical behavior within an agency. Is the organization, for example, 
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transparent and does it consider the damaging effects of its actions on parties other than 
those directly involved? Does it protect the interests of different groups (Carpenter, 
2010: 46)? As such, an organization may be considered to be very successful in terms of 
its performative reputation, but not so much so when it comes to moral reputation. For 
the AFM and its moral reputation towards the industry, I will especially be looking at 
how the AFM ensures the protection of the individual consumer. 
Procedural reputation is another dimension of reputation that will shape the reaction of 
audiences. Comparable to but different from moral reputation procedural reputation 
entails the justness of the behavior of the organization in a more formal (legal) sense. 
Carpenter illustrates the concept by posing such questions as: ‘’whatever the decision, 
audiences (particularly courts and some scientific audiences) may ask, did the 
organization follow accepted procedures to come to its decision?’’ (Carpenter, 2010: 47). 
This form of reputation is therefore more strongly connected to norms of deliberation, 
procedure or decision-making. In my research, I will therefore be looking at how the 
AFM refers to deliberation with the regulated industry and how it justifies its actions by 
emphasizing the political-legal framework in which it operates.  
The fourth form of reputation that Carpenter outlines is technical reputation. Connected 
to the concept of reputation uniqueness, it entails to what extent an organization is 
viewed as sufficiently qualified and professional to perform its tasks. Does an agency 
have enough expertise within its organization to be a successful regulator? Important 
aspects of this form of reputation are ‘’scientific accuracy, methodological prowess and 
analytic capacity’’ (Carpenter, 2010: 47). For this research, I will bind the technical 
reputation of the AFM to references of professionality and expertise within the 
organization.  
Reputation uniqueness 
Carpenter introduces another important concept in his theoretical framework of 
reputation. Regulatory agencies are aware of what Carpenter calls reputation 
uniqueness: the ‘’demonstration by agencies that they can create solutions and provide 
services that no other agency in the polity offers’’ (Carpenter, 2001: 5). In the field of 
financial regulation, it is fundamental that an agency can prove that it fulfills a crucial 
role that no other organization can easily fulfill. Moreover, if an organization can 
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illustrate to its principals that it possesses a unique capacity to tackle regulatory 
challenges, it will gain more power with regard to the latter. A very important first 
reminder in this context is that, in the relationship between AFM and the industry, it is 
the industry that carries all the costs of supervision. In this sense, one can also see the 
industry itself as a sort of principal who provides the resources to the AFM as a 
regulatory agency. This means that it becomes even more important for the AFM to 
prove to the industry that it fulfills a crucial role that no other organization can easily 
fulfill. A second aspect that is important to note regarding reputation uniqueness is that 
the AFM operates within the Twin Peaks model of financial sector regulation (see the 
chapter on research context). As such, and regarding the theoretical definition of 
Carpenter that focusses on how it is all about services that no other agency in the polity 
can offer, an interesting discussion within my analysis will be whether the industry does 
indeed see the AFM as an agency that has a right to existence in its form as a separate 
organization from the DNB.  
Audiences 
Reputation uniqueness is also important in understanding the crucial link between 
reputational concerns and audiences. Different forms of reputation matter to different 
audiences. Carpenter & Krause emphasize the importance of the ‘’richly textured 
political environment’’ in which regulatory agencies function. This environment consists 
of multiple audiences: any ‘’individual or collective that observes a regulatory 
organization and can judge it’’ (Carpenter, 2010: 33). Audiences are numerous and can 
be groups such as politicians, the regulated industry, the public or the media. Each of 
these audiences has a different perspective on the work of the agency and thus influence 
the reputation of the organization.   
An example that helps us to understand the concept of audience in the context of 
reputation is the previously mentioned capacity of legislatures to grant authority to a 
regulator (Carpenter, 2010: 34). If a national parliament thinks highly of an agency, they 
will be likely to entrust them with more financial capacity. The agency therefore tries to 
shape the responses of these parliamentary groups to the work of the organization. This 
implies that an agency will have to consider these perspectives when it comes to their 
judgement of its work and hence whether it is considered to be an organization unique 
in terms of its reputation. This form of organizational distinction can be very valuable to 
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agencies for different reasons.  As illustrated, reputational concerns are often discussed 
in the context of an agency and its accountability towards the political principal. In 
maintaining their bureaucratic autonomy towards national governments, agencies use 
their reputation as a political resource.  
What about the regulated industry as an audience as it is the subject of research in my 
case study? I have already discussed some of the specifics in the relationship between 
the AFM and the regulated industry. It might also be fairly obvious in which ways the 
priorities of the regulated industry as an audience differ from other audiences. The 
regulated industry is rarely viewed as a collection of well-intentioned, moral firms that 
have the greater good of the citizens in their country at heart (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012: 
49). Firms look to make profit, and regulation often prevents them from making more 
profit. This leads to two important points. One, a regulatory agency should have very 
good reasons to set new regulations or amend existing ones. If firms in the industry feel 
that is not the case, they are likely to oppose them and resort to evasive behavior. 
Interventions in the industry in the form of warnings or sanctions should originate in 
even stronger validity. Two, the industry creates its response based on the likelihood of 
being caught should they choose to disobey the rules.   
These aspects concerning the regulated industry are linked to the different forms of 
reputation as presented above. In the next section on the management of reputation, I 
will discuss how different forms of reputation and the regulated industry as audience 
are linked.  
 
4.3 Managing reputation and the three-step cycle 
I have laid down how we should interpret the notion of reputation within my research. 
Moreover, the different forms of reputation and the regulated industry in the 
Netherlands have been discussed. In this section, I link these concepts more explicitly by 
using the three-step cycle presented by Wæraas and Byrkjeflot (2012) as discussed in 
our literature review. In addition, the concepts of action and communication will be 
reviewed to clarify how they provide a basis for our analysis of the reputation of the 
AFM.  
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Three-step cycle 
I have already discussed in the literature review how the three-step cycle of Wæraas and 
Byrkjeflot (2012) illustrates the different aspects of reputation management. The five 
problems that they see within the three-step cycle however have not been discussed. I 
will use these five problems to illustrate the difficulties in reputation management and 
thus provide a framework of how one should see my analysis of the reputation 
management of the AFM.  
In the first step, there are two issues: the politics problem and the consistency problem 
(see figure 1). Firstly, there are doubts about whether the leadership and employees of 
an organization are actually able freely to choose their reputation strategy. Because they 
act in a political context (the political nature of their organization), they are constrained 
in their range of choices. Secondly, creating consistency in the reputation platform is 
challenging. There are differences in terms of culture, professions or demography that 
need to be addressed as well as differences between policy development and 
implementation: a consistency problem. 
Concerning the second step of the cycle, the charisma and uniqueness problem also 
become apparent.  As Wæraas & Byrkjeflot explain, not all organizations (especially in 
the public sector) can ‘’ build emotional appeal, and few have the autonomy to ‘speak 
freely’ or otherwise act independently of the political level ‘’ (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 
2012: 191). This is the so-called charisma problem. Moreover, public organizations are 
mostly required by law to behave in similar ways to provide equal services. This aspect 
also highlights the problem of being unique.  
In the third step, discussions arise concerning the excellency of an organization: the 
excellence problem. As the work of Luoma-Aho (2007) already emphasized, excellence is 
not always within reach for public organizations, or even desirable.  In general, most 
public organizations struggle to achieve excellency and as such this becomes a question 
as to what the goal should be of reputation management.  
Action 
For my analysis of the interview results, action is an important concept as firms base 
their image of the AFM largely on the actions of the Dutch regulator. What do I define as 
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actions? I follow Lodge & Wegrich (2014) in their review of the core of regulation in 
discussing three theoretical aspects regarding actions: standard-setting, behavior 
modification and information-gathering (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014: 13).  
Standard-setting concerns the setting out of the direction, objective and form of 
regulation. As such, standard-setting includes for example the choice for state based 
regulation or a form of self-regulation by the industry. Behavior modification is all about 
how rules are complied with and how enforcement takes shape. Compliance can be 
founded on advice and deliberation or on stronger forms of threat or punishment (the 
naming and shaming of offenders in the media as example). Lastly, information-
gathering is concerned with detection: if a regulator wants to set standards and shape 
the behavior of firms, it needs information on what is happening in the industry. 
Regulators have a wide range of choices to make when it comes to information-
gathering, ranging from regular inspections to compulsory monthly reports.  
Firms often complain that the regulatory burden is too high in their industry (Lodge & 
Wegrich, 2014: 18). I believe that in my analysis of the reputation of the AFM, these 
three aspects will help us in understanding in a more nuanced way what exactly the 
criticisms may be that shape the image of firms of the actions of the AFM.   
Communication 
These actions often demand explanation. This is where communication becomes crucial 
in shaping the reputation of an agency. In the quantitative content analysis, I will 
explicitly look at the communication of the AFM in the form of speeches made by board 
members to the regulated industry. Communication should therefore in this context be 
seen as ‘’ an explanation of the actions and choices of the regulator ‘’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 
2014: 21).  
An important question within our discussion of communication is, following the work of 
Luoma-Aho (2007) if we can indeed find evidence of that the AFM strives for a more 
neutral reputation or an excellent reputation: do they show some form of self-reflection 
and reservation in the justification of their actions? And in line with Maor, Gilad and 
Ben-Nun Bloom (2015), it might be interesting to see if I detect any hint of strategic 
silences on times or topics that do not fit the AFM. The main focus of this study however 
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remains to uncover the specifics of the reputation management of the AFM and not so 
much to look at the ultimate goal of reputation management.  
 
4.4 The impact of financial crises and transnational networks 
Another important question within my research concerns the impact of financial crises 
and transnational networks on the domestic reputation of a regulatory agency. I will 
combine related concepts from earlier academic work to provide a theoretical 
background for our analysis of these influences.  
The impact of the financial crisis 
The financial crisis has fundamentally transformed the world of international financial 
regulation. It is also my premise that these events have changed the position and 
reputation of financial regulators. I base this premise on a series of different steps. 
First, as argued in the chapter on research context, financial regulators have had many 
criticisms to endure throughout the years because of their failing role in preventing a 
worldwide economic meltdown. This has damaged their reputation (see for example 
Lodge & Wegrich; 2014 or recent reports by the European Commission) and led to two 
developments. On the one hand, regulators have been forced to act with more strength 
and severity to compensate for their restraint before the outbreak of the crises. A large 
body of work in regulation theory has shown that agencies increase the frequency with 
which they enforce regulation if more response-based forms of regulation fail. A concept 
that clarifies this mechanism is the enforcement pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992). Ayres and Braithwaite see persuasion and dialogue as the starting point of any 
enforcement activity, but if this does not work, regulators need to have a ‘’ benign big 
gun in their enforcement armory’’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992: 35).  
On the other hand, this friendly gun calls for more authority and a broader legislative 
mandate: if a regulator is to act with power, it will to a certain extent need the political 
support to do so. Performative reputation (towards the political principle) then becomes 
crucial as they make efforts to gain more tasks. So, from this point of view, I expect that 
an agency engaged in financial regulation will focus more on its performative reputation 
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to attract more resources from its political principle and will increase its capacity to 
make decisions concerning financial regulation.  
Decision-making in transnational networks 
But an important result of the financial crisis is that nowadays decisions in financial 
regulation are increasingly made in transnational networks such as the ESMA. As briefly 
touched upon in the literature review, these networks offer different advantages that 
can scarcely be ignored by domestic regulators as international economic ties grow 
more complex, especially concerning financial regulation. But this also means that 
domestic regulators enroll in some form of a ‘two-level game’ as sketched by Robert 
Putnam (1988): concerning domestic matters, the national regulator is dominant, but at 
the international level it is only one of many. Besides making decisions concerning 
regulation in itself more complex as agencies try to represent the interests of the 
domestic actors at this international level, participation in transnational networks also 
limits the degrees of freedom of an agency and decreases the capacity of a regulator to 
make decisions concerning financial regulation on its own. Majone (1994) shows for 
example that, in the case of the European Union, the capacity of many national 
regulators to make independent decisions has significantly decreased. This would 
contradict the trend that I expect as a result of the pressures of financial crises.  
 
4.5 Theoretical expectations  
It is difficult to formulate truly falsifiable hypotheses research such as this. It is however 
insightful to present several expectations that follow from our theoretical framework. 
These expectations provide something of a horizon during our case study and provide 
the reader with a sense of direction and structure when discussing the results of my 
research. 
Expectations regarding the different forms of reputation 
I have presented four different forms of reputation: moral, performative, procedural and 
technical. As the AFM is a financial regulator, I expect that they will particularly focus on 
their technical (complicated sector) and moral (low trust in financial sector) reputation 
in its communication towards the industry.  
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Expectations regarding the management of reputation 
Reputation management is a difficult process with several prominent problems that I 
have discussed. I therefore expect that the desired image of the AFM and the reputation 
of the agency amongst firms in the industry will not correspond. Moreover, I expect that, 
because of the Twin Peaks system in the Netherlands and the separate roles of the two 
regulators, the uniqueness problem will be of particular relevance in the opinion of the 
industry.  
Expectations regarding the impact of financial crises and increase of decision-making in 
transnational networks 
As the financial crisis has led to great public pressure on the role of regulators and their 
reputation, the AFM will emphasize how it has become stricter in its supervision and in 
its messages to the regulated industry: an increase in references to performative 
reputation.  
Transnational networks have led to a growth of decisions made at the international 
instead of national level. Concerns regarding a possible decrease in decision-making 
capacity will lead to an increased emphasis on international standards in the 
communication of the AFM.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
It should now be clear how the different theoretical concepts that have been introduced 
in this chapter relate to each other and how they are to be used as a framework for this 
research. To conclude this chapter, I am going to briefly link the different concepts to 
each other in a more explicit way.  
Reputation can be seen as a set of beliefs about an organization’s capacities, intentions, 
history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences. It has 
different forms: moral, procedural, technical and performative. My theoretical premise 
is that regulators are generally rational and politically conscious organizations that 
cautiously construct and protect their unique reputations: a matter of reputation 
management. The different steps in the three-step cycle show however that agencies 
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face different problems (politics, consistency, charisma, uniqueness and excellency) 
when they try to shape their reputation. These problems shape the context in which 
regulators operate. Earlier work has also shown that the reputation of an agency is 
based mainly on two aspects: action (standard-setting, behavior modifying and 
information-gathering) and communication (explaining and justifying their actions and 
choices). I expect that the AFM will try to shape its reputation through its choice of 
certain actions and the framing of those choices. Also, the industry will judge the work of 
the AFM on the basis of their actions and communication.  
The context in which the AFM has operated has also drastically changed due to a major 
financial crisis and the growth of transnational networks. The pressure resulting from 
the crisis leads me to expect that the AFM will engage in more pro-active and stricter 
behavior towards the industry, moving them to request more tasks from its political 
principle and hence deepening its decision-making capacity. On the other hand, as the 
AFM increasingly participates in transnational networks because of the economic 
complexity and international character of financial regulation, their decision-making 
capacity decreases because decisions have to be made together with a plethora of other 
network members. This contraposition complicates their capacity to actively manage 
their reputation.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss the design of my research and show how I have tried to 
incorporate these different theoretical concepts into my own empirical study of the 
reputation of the AFM.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I will outline the research design of my paper. First, the 
operationalization of the theoretical concepts will be discussed. Validity is of the utmost 
importance in this discussion. I will then zoom in on my mixed research method and 
more specifically on issues of (inter-coder) reliability. The selection of our case will then 
be reviewed, focusing on why exactly the AFM is an interesting actor upon which to test 
our theoretical assumptions. I will then conclude this section of my paper by discussing 
the means of data collection. 
 
5.2 Operationalization  
In order to correctly capture the different forms of reputation, I have to make the 
somewhat abstract concepts from my theoretical framework suitable for my own 
empirical research. The first form of reputation concerns performative reputation, which 
I define as the extent to which an agency reaches the goals set by different audiences 
and how. In my analysis, I will therefore look for fragments and passages in texts that 
include indicators such as references to performance, efficiency and expediency. As for 
moral reputation, I conceptualize this as the extent to which the actions of a regulatory 
agency are seen by a particular audience as moral and ethical. Important indicators are 
considerations of morality, transparency, collectivism, trust or the interest of individual 
clients. Procedural reputation is seen as the extent to which the actions of an agency 
follow accepted procedures and (judicial or political) agreements. References to political 
standards, agreements, procedures, deliberation or international standards are 
perceived to be indicators of this particular form of reputation. Lastly, I define technical 
reputation as the extent to which an agency is seen as sufficiently qualified and 
professional enough to fulfill its tasks. To this end, I will look for words indicating 
concepts such as expertise, professionality and uniqueness of the organization to 
capture this form of reputation in my analysis.  
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Form of reputation Operationalization Indicators 
Performative 
reputation 
Extent to which the agency reaches 
the goals set by different audiences. 
Performance 
Expediency 
Efficiency 
Compliment to industry 
Self-reflection 
Moral reputation Extent to which the actions of an 
agency are seen as moral and ethical.  
Morality 
Transparency 
Collectivism 
Reservation 
Procedural reputation Extent to which the actions of an 
agency follow accepted procedures 
and agreements. 
Agreements 
Deliberation 
International standards 
Technical reputation Extent to which an agency is seen as 
sufficiently qualified and 
professional to fulfill its tasks. 
Expertise 
Professionality 
Uniqueness 
Understanding industry 
Table 3. Different forms of reputation and its indicators 
Validity is an important consideration in the operationalization of these concepts. More 
specifically, I aim to achieve a constant and independent interpretation and correct 
measurement of the concepts in my research data. Concerning internal validity, I believe 
that the operationalization of the concepts will correctly capture the meaning of these 
different forms of reputation within my research. However, I realize that for some 
passages in the speeches it might be the case that it can be coded in more than one 
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category. If this is the case, I will code the passage for both (or more) forms of 
reputation.  
To provide the reader with some feeling for how I chose to code different passages from 
the speeches, I offer the following table with short illustrative quotations for each of the 
indicators.  
Collectivism The AFM is the referee that guides the game. We make sure the 
good-willing do not suffer under the action of the wicked. We 
promote an honest and level playing field for all the market parties 
(Hoogervorst, 2008). 
Morality At the same time, it is important to realize that if the purpose of 
financial reporting is to be as faithful as possible, it is less relevant 
who the user of the financial statement is (Hoogervorst, 2008).  
Reservation With an apparatus of 450 employees we are simply not able to check 
all the actions and choices of roughly 450,000 people in the Dutch 
financial industry. We therefore expect at least some form of self-
regulation from the industry (Kockelkoren, 2011). 
Transparency But current developments do not only demand more expertise. They 
also ask for openness concerning rewards and transparent 
communication of your firms towards the individual client 
(Kockelkoren, 2009). 
Compliment to 
industry 
The last six months I have witnessed many hopeful initiatives in the 
sector. There is increased attention for clients and their interests. 
Moreover, we see that products are increasingly of better quality.  
(Van Vroonhoven, 2014).  
Efficiency We as the AFM want to look at ways in which we can make our 
supervision more efficient. So that we don’ t leave you with 
unnecessary bureaucratic hassle. Concerning authorizations for 
example, we have improved the whole process by adding extra 
capacity and phone numbers to the service (Vroonhoven, 2014). 
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Interest of 
industry 
But financial regulation is also important for your industry. Did you 
know that we receive compliments on a regular basis from firms? 
When? When we handled a malicious firm in your industry for 
example (Hoogervorst, 2011). 
Rigor Looking forward I conclude that a better performance is needed to 
meet expectations regarding the audits of financial statements in the 
financial sector. To meet these expectations auditors need to be fully 
aware that their real clients are the investors and other users of 
financial reporting (Maijoor, 2010). 
Self-reflection When I made the step from the Ministry to the AFM I noticed 
immediately that there is a different culture within the AFM. Some 
aspects of it were better, but some of them also needed 
improvement. We as AFM are motivated to strengthen our own 
culture. And as such, we also see that changing the organizational 
culture requires time and effort (Hoogervorst, 2011). 
Agreements Our supervision is based on the instruments that the legislator 
hands us. As such we base our actions on the legislation Wet op het 
Financieel Toezicht or de Wet Toezicht Financiële Verslaggeving 
(Maatman, 2010). 
Deliberation Also, it is highly recommendable that auditors and prudential 
regulators intensify their communication in the future. If auditors 
cannot raise their concerns in public, they should be able to do so 
with the regulators (Hoogervorst, 2009).  
International 
standards 
While we continue to need national financial supervisors, it would 
be highly helpful to create an independent European supervisory 
agency (Hoogervorst, 2008).  
Expertise As you may be aware, the AFM has been a very active participant in 
the international debate on high frequency trading and other forms 
of automated and algorithmic trading. (..) We believe the original 
Commission proposal looks very promising, although in our opinion 
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it will still need some tweaks here and there (Gerritse, 2012). 
Professionality As AFM we make continuous investments to understand societal 
developments. Our people respond to technological developments 
and are constantly making efforts to improve the way the AFM 
supervises (Vroonhoven, 2016). 
Understanding 
industry 
We at the AFM know that recent years have been tough for your 
industry. The AFM news letters in your mailboxes were filled with 
articles on quality of financial advice, commission bans and more. 
We realize that this has asked a lot of your organizations and that 
these years have not been easy for you (Vroonhoven, 2014). 
Uniqueness If the AFM would indeed have been authorized to act, then the 
consequences would have been less severe. It is why the AFM has 
suggested that we receive the legislative mandate to oversee the 
product development process (Kockelkoren, 2011). 
Table 4. Illustrative quotations for each of the indicators 
 
5.3 Research methods  
I use a mixed-methods research approach in this paper, approaching the research 
question from both a quantitative (statistical analysis of eighty-seven speeches) as well 
as qualitative (analysis of seven interviews with industry and experts) angle. As such, I 
tackle the issue of reputation management from both sides: supply and demand.   
The content analysis 
My research concerns a single-case study. This has different advantages and 
weaknesses. Strong generalization is not applicable in a single-case study. But rather 
what is termed analytical generalization, which means that the implications of my 
findings are important for theory development in our particular field of research. I aim 
to test our theoretical assumptions during this study using a deeper, more detailed 
single case. To analyze the empirical data (the speeches and transcriptions of 
interviews) the software program Nvivo is used. Nvivo is particularly suitable for very 
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rich text-based information, in which users need to organize and structure and classify 
information. For my analysis, it allows me to code passages of text into different child-
categories (our indicators) of main categories (the different forms of reputation). This 
offers the reader a deeper understanding of the ways in which our theoretical concepts 
can be applied to different texts and hence which forms of reputation will be more 
prominent in different variations (time, person, industry).  
To offer an impression and understanding of how these speeches were coded and 
analyzed in our project, I now discuss elements of two of the speeches in our research. 
For most of the indicators and different forms of reputation, it is clear how I can 
categorize various parts of text into these different divisions. For example, references 
made by AFM board-members to how professional their organization is (mentioning 
reports and dedication of employees) or their level of expertise (referring to the 
extensive pool of knowledge that exists within the AFM organization) can be fairly easily 
classified as instances of technical reputation. Other passages however can be more 
difficult to analyze and categorize, as they refer to more ambiguous aspects of 
reputation.  
The first speech I use as example was given by Steven Maijoor in his position as 
chairman of the AFM and chair of the International Forum of Independent Audit 
Regulators (IFIAR) at the European Commission Conference on International 
Developments in Accounting and Auditing in Brussels on 8th February 2010: 
‘’My main message today is simple. We need to be much more ambitious regarding 
international cooperation in auditing oversight. Currently, there is a large gap between 
the level of cooperation and integration of auditing regulators compared with the level 
of cooperation and integration of the international networks of audit firms that we need 
to oversee. Failing to increase the level of international cooperation is a substantial risk 
for the effectiveness of auditing oversight’’ (Maijoor, 2010: 1). 
This passage clearly makes references to the importance of international cooperation 
for the AFM. As such, it illustrates how some references were easy to categorize.  
Therefore, our second example originates from a speech made by Michiel Denkers, Head 
of Regulation at the AFM, at the Vrije Universiteit Symposium on Trust, Compliance and 
Regulation on 14th March 2014: 
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‘’The AFM applies a problem oriented approach to regulation. In other words, it has a 
strong focus on solving  ́real ́ problems and achieving measurable outcomes. In the end 
firms are best placed to assess how they can contribute to the delivery of these 
outcomes. If the level of trust is insufficient and the relationship is impaired, firms will 
have a tendency to play it safe. They will be inclined to stick as close to the letter of the 
law as they can. And to devote equal attention to important and less important things. 
Important that is, if you look at it from a problem-oriented, material point of view’’ 
(Denkers, 2014: 3). 
This example contains references to different indicators. Consider for example how 
Denkers mentions the way the AFM applies a problem oriented approach to regulation, 
in which it focusses on solving ‘real problems’. Does this mean the AFM wants to portray 
itself as an organization that only focusses on real problems and not on less important 
and futile aspects of the work of the regulated industry? To assess this, we should 
consider the rest of the speech and the context (which audience and what period). In 
this way, it illustrates the importance of analyzing these speeches within the correct 
context.  
I aim to achieve a high level of inter-coder reliability in my analysis, hoping that if the 
analysis of my data is done by different individuals with the same pre-defined 
categories, they will arrive at the same results. Because of this, I ran the analysis and 
coding of our empirical material twice to see if my approach was consistent. To decide 
whether or not an important difference is significant, I use the Chi-Square statistic. 
 
5.4 Case selection  
The case selected is the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets. As mentioned above, 
the Dutch financial sector is also regulated by the DNB. The AFM was however selected 
because of several reasons. First, the AFM is responsible for regulating behavior on the 
financial markets in the Netherlands. It aims to increase the accessibility of financial 
markets by promoting the confidence in all parties involved. As such, in its role as 
regulator, the AFM focusses on positively changing the behavior of the regulated 
industry and is often characterized as `the financial watchdog that barks when it sees 
irresponsible behavior of market parties’.  
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Moreover, the AFM has received a considerable amount of criticism in recent years due 
to disagreements amongst the members of its supervisory board. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 
the Dutch Minister of Finance, disapproved of the ‘sloppy culture of integrity’ at the AFM 
and different Dutch researchers and experts emphasized how the incidents have 
damaged the reputation of the Dutch agency (NRC Handelsblad, 2017). In addition, 
various Dutch experts such as Rob Schotsman of the University of Amsterdam have 
doubted the added value and hence the reasons for the existence of the AFM as a 
separate regulator in addition to the DNB in the Netherlands (SC Online, 2015). The 
regulated industry has also regularly complained about the AFM’s methods. In June 
2016 for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), one of the largest Dutch auditing 
firms, called for an independent organization to judge the way in which the AFM reached 
decisions to impose sanctions on market parties (AM Web, 2016). The criticism of the 
AFM from experts, politicians as well as the regulated industry itself gives rise to my 
premise that reputation management will be an important consideration in the work of 
the AFM.  
The AFM was also selected because of more practical reasons. Logic dictates that the 
AFM is a much smaller organisation than the DNB which makes our analysis more 
manageable considering the limited amount of time for this research. Moreover, the 
availability of speeches was greater for the AFM than for the DNB.  
The period my analysis covers is from the years 2006 to 2016. I have selected this 
timespan for several reasons. One of the main turning points time-wise in my research is 
the Great Recession that started in 2008 and ended in 2013 (NRC, 2013). Within my 
selected research period, we are able to analyze three different periods: the two to three 
years before the start of the financial crisis (2006-2008), a term that covers the financial 
crisis itself (2009-2013) and a post-crisis period (2014-2016). Another reason for 
choosing this period is the availability and quality of research data. Especially with 
regard to my main empirical source of data, the eighty-seven speeches made by AFM 
representatives, I discovered that these were only available for the period 2006 to 2016.  
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5.5 Data collection  
My data consists of two main sources. First, I have eighty-seven speeches (in the period 
2006 to 2016) which were made available by the AFM. According to the organization 
itself, these were almost all available public speeches made in this period at events for 
the industry. These speeches were given in different situations and to different 
audiences. Examples of the events at which these speeches were given are the National 
Pension Conference of 2013 and the FOW European Equity Options Trading Conference 
of 2012. More speeches than the eighty-seven I used were available for this period, but I 
decided to not include speeches that were shorter than 300 words, for example sheets 
with bullet points for presentations. The reason for this is that I could not judge to what 
extent certain passages could or should be interpreted.  
I complemented the findings from the content analysis with the results from five 
interviews with representatives of the regulated industry and two expert interviews. I 
was able to speak to five out of sixteen organizations in the Panel of Representative 
Organizations of the AFM. The two context-interviews were held with a former member 
of the supervisory board of the AFM and a current member of the AFM commission on 
Financial Reporting and Accountancy. More information on the exact respondents is 
available in the digital appendix as I decided to maintain the anonymity of the people 
interviewed when discussing the results. This was done at their request.  
Both the speeches as well as the transcripts of the interviews were analyzed in Nvivo 
and can be found in the digital appendix of this paper.  
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CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Now at last I come to the most important part of this paper: the empirical analysis. This 
part of the paper has been divided into two sections: the quantitative content analysis of 
the speeches and the qualitative interview analysis. In this first chapter, which discusses 
the results from the quantitative content analysis, my aim is to look at the 
communication of the AFM, as I presume that they will use it to handle their reputation 
in the second step of the management cycle.  
This section is therefore built up from different parts. To create a general image and 
impression of my findings, I present a number of descriptive statistics concerning the 
entire analysis. I then move to the different variations on the dependent variables, 
briefly discussing the results per period of time, per AFM board member and per 
industry. Then, a section is dedicated specifically to the link between 
internationalization and domestic reputation. After which, I look at the statistical 
significance of the most important results using the Chi-Square statistic. I conclude this 
chapter with some final remarks and remaining questions that I hope to answer with my 
qualitative analysis.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics  
I analyzed a total of 87 speeches in the period 2006 to 2016. The availability of these 
speeches in different periods differed. For the pre-crisis years (2006 and 2007) only a 
handful of speeches were available. Remarkably, in the period that the crisis starts (end 
of 2008 and 2009), the amount of available speeches increases (15 for 2008 and 13 for 
2009). I will return to this anomaly in the reflective section of my paper.  
Year/number  
2006: 1 2012: 5 
2007: 2 2013: 5 
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2008: 16 2014: 11 
2009: 14 2015: 8 
2010: 9 2016: 3 
2011: 13 N=87 
Table 5. Overview of speeches for each year 
What about the amount of speeches for each board member? Hans Hoogervorst (22) and 
Theodoor Kockelkoren (24) were the two board members by whom the largest number 
of speeches was available. For the other board members, the number of speeches 
differed. For recent years for example, I was able to retrieve 9 speeches made by Merel 
van Vroonhoven.  
Board member/Number of 
speeches 
Number of speeches 
Hans Docters: 1 Steven Maijoor: 4 
Paul Koster: 4 Rene Maatman: 4 
Hans Hoogervorst: 22 Michiel Denkers: 5 
Harman Korte: 5 Ronald Gerritse: 8 
Theodoor Kockelkoren: 24 Merel van Vroonhoven: 9 
Table 6. Board members and number of speeches 
I now turn to the main results in terms of the four different forms of reputation. In 
general, it appears that performative reputation scores the highest by far in all speeches 
over the entire period 2006 to 2016, with the other three forms of reputation following 
very close to each other. One might therefore argue that the AFM is consciously 
emphasizing how it performs and in what way it fulfills its tasks (and what these tasks 
actually are). The four broad categories demand further specification however, which 
fortunately the more detailed indicators offer.  
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Form of reputation Sources/references 
Moral reputation 58/159 
Performative reputation 68/326 
Procedural reputation 60/194 
Technical reputation 58/172 
Table 7. Overall scores on different general forms of reputation 
As explained in the chapter on research design, I did not code directly for any one form 
of reputation, but rather through the different indicators that are child-categories of the 
different groups. In the table below, I present an overview of the total score of each of 
our indicators for the entire period and total of 87 speeches. Not surprisingly, rigor 
(which is seen as a child-category of performative reputation) scores the highest with 
232 references in more than 60 of the speeches.  
Moral reputation Performative 
reputation 
Procedural 
reputation 
Technical 
reputation 
Collectivism: 27/38  Compliment to 
industry: 10/19 
Agreements: 32/47 Expertise: 4/10 
Morality: 37/65 Efficiency: 5/14 Deliberation: 35/74 Professionality: 
44/90 
Reservation: 27/37 Interest of industry: 
21/35 
International 
standards: 29/73 
Understanding 
industry: 28/44 
Transparency: 
15/19 
Rigor: 61/232  Uniqueness: 20/28 
 Self-reflection: 
18/26 
  
Table 8. Total scores per indicator for entire period (number of speeches / total score) 
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Other interestingly high scores are those of the indicators for deliberation (74 
references), international standards (73 references), morality (65 references) and 
professionality (90 references). Deliberation, which is coded under procedural 
reputation, is an important part of the work of AFM. My analysis shows that it is 
emphasized in 35 speeches made by different board members. Is the AFM indeed a 
partner that is open for consultation? I will return to this issue in the discussion of the 
interview results.  
One of the main questions within my research is how international cooperation has 
changed the reputation of the AFM within the regulated industry. It is therefore 
interesting to see that international standards were referred to directly in 32 speeches. 
The ways in which international standards were brought forward in the different 
speeches differed. Often, board members pointed to the broad and abstract influence of 
European (political) cooperation in their reference to international standards (Koster, 
2006 for example). Sometimes they call directly for more cooperation in financial 
supervision, such as Hans Hoogervorst did in the midst of the financial crisis in 2009 
(see the digital appendix for the original speeches). Overall, international standards do 
seem to be an important aspect of the message coming from the AFM. A crucial question 
however is whether a rise can be seen in references to international standards as 
transnational networks become more important over the years analyzed.  
Morality is as also an essential part of the AFM message. Trust, integrity, transparency, 
protection: in 37 speeches board members made direct references to the importance of 
morality. This cannot be seen as a surprise as it is the core message of the AFM: to 
ensure trust in the functioning of the financial sector. Professionality is also something 
that the AFM emphasizes. The speeches showed that board members often illustrated 
exactly how the AFM works and why it chooses to do certain things in a certain way. The 
large number of references to professionality is not an unexpected result as one of the 
goals of communication by board members is to explain actions and decisions, both of 
which relate to professionality.  
In the following sections, I will discuss whether and how the frequency of these 
indicators has changed for the given period of time, for each of the board members and 
for the different industries. 
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6.3 Per period  
A more interesting way of approaching the results from my content analysis is to look at 
the different periods. I noticed some remarkable changes in the content of the speeches 
throughout the years. From 2008 to 2013, the (relative) frequency of passages that 
explicitly refer to a strong and rigid stance of the AFM is high. From 2014 on however, 
this number of references to performative reputation declines somewhat.    
Another difference, related to the AFM and its reputation as a strong regulator, is the 
number of compliments it gives to the regulated industry throughout the years. During 
the crisis years (2008-2013), almost no references (4 references) were found in my 
analysis of compliments paid to the industry. Since the year 2014, and especially in the 
speeches of Merel van Vroonhoven who became chairwoman in this year, I find an 
increase (for example 19 in the period 2015 to 2016) in compliments to the industry. If 
we also look at the number of speeches for this period, we can see that there is a 
significant rise in references. How can I explain this result? As I will also discuss in the 
next chapter on the interview results, it seems to be a combination of the personal style 
of Merel Vroonhoven and, considering the content of the speeches, the emphasis of the 
AFM on the progress that the sector has made in recent post-crisis years.  
References to morality remain fairly stable throughout the years. In the majority of the 
speeches throughout our period of analysis, the AFM emphasizes the importance of trust 
and transparency, which, as discussed before, comes as no surprise taking into account 
its role as financial supervisor.  
 2006-2008 
(18) 
2009-2010 
(25) 
2011-2012 
(18) 
2013-2014 
(16) 
2015-2016 
(11) 
Moral 
reputation 
(159) 
19 37 40 32 31 
Performative 
reputation 
(326) 
25 85 101 67 48 
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Procedural 
reputation 
(172) 
32 40 36 35 29 
Technical 
reputation 
(194) 
36 49 39 41 29 
Table 9. Scores per time period (with number of speeches for each period) 
 
6.4 Per AFM board member  
From my meetings with experts on financial regulation in the Netherlands, it soon 
became clear that I could expect differences between the various board members not 
least due to their personal style and preferences. Although I do not discuss these results 
in great depth as they are less relevant to my research question, the findings are related 
to the previously mentioned charisma problem and as such are of some interest to my 
study of the reputation management of the AFM.  
Clear differences can be seen between the board members. This could either be 
attributed to their portfolio or their personal position within the AFM. The four board 
members by whom we have the most speeches are Theodor Kockelkoren, Hans 
Hoogervorst, Ronald Gerritse and Merel van Vroonhoven. I will discuss the results from 
these four names to offer some insight into the differences between the various board 
members.  
For Theodor Kockelkoren (board member from 2003 to 2015) my results show that rigor 
is an important aspect of his 24 speeches. He seems to emphasize how the AFM is a 
strong and professional organization that demands a lot from the regulated industry. 
Kockelkoren also often discusses how the AFM does its work in a professional way. He 
makes less references to morality when comparing him with other speakers.   
Hans Hoogervorst, chairman from 2007 to 2011, focusses more on how morality is 
important to the AFM. In 17 of his 22 speeches, he makes references to different 
indicators of moral reputation. Hoogervorst regularly underlines how trust and integrity 
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are fundamental principles that the AFM expects to see in the organization of firms in 
the regulated industry.  
I have 8 speeches in total that were given by Ronald Gerritse, who was chairman of the 
AFM from 2011 to 2013. His speeches can be characterized as a form of communication 
that balances between the different forms of reputation. He of course, makes references 
to the strictness of the AFM and also to morality and professionality, but overall his 
speeches generate an image of a board member who is less at ease.  
In the speeches given by Merel van Vroonhoven (who became chairwoman in 2014), the 
industry seems to be looked at in a more friendly way, which corresponds to the time 
period in which she leads the AFM (2014-now). Compliments to the industry occur more 
regularly and references to understanding the industry also score higher in her 
speeches. One could argue that this is also the stance of the AFM in this period: the 
deepest period of the crisis has past, and the AFM is focusing more on strengthening its 
technical and procedural reputation as an understanding and benevolent partner.   
In the discussion of the interview results, I will also review how those interviewed see 
these personal differences between the different board members. Do they really signal 
differences in the reputation of the AFM in the periods during which these board 
members were active or can these variations be attributed to personal style? This is an 
important question, as it gives us some insight into whether the differences between the 
board members in term of their scores on different reputations can be attributed to their 
own personal position or the context (for example the period) of their work. 
 Kockelkoren 
(24) 
Hoogervorst 
(22) 
Gerritse (8)  Vroonhoven 
(9) 
Moral 
reputation 
34 46  18 23 
Performative 
reputation 
91 69 44 36 
Procedural 
reputation 
39 51 16 21 
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Technical 
reputation 
43 57 18 34 
Table 10. Scores per AFM board member (and number of speeches per board member) 
 
6.5 Per industry  
It might also be interesting to see if there is any variation in terms of the different 
industries. I have analyzed the four most important kinds of public that are addressed in 
the speeches made by AFM board members: bankers, accountants, insurers and advisors 
and pension federations.  
For bankers, references to performative reputation are especially frequent. In the 
speeches that I analyzed, I found that these references in speeches to the banking 
industry were often about how the AFM urged the banking industry to perform better 
and become more ambitious in their work. This is most probably related to the role of 
the banking industry in the recent crisis. Concerning the references for the accounting 
industry, I also find a relatively high number of references to performative reputation. In 
the content of the speeches however, I do not find any clear reason for this result. As 
such, I cannot explain this finding and future research should prove whether or not the 
AFM is more concerned with building a reputation as a strict regulator of the accounting 
industry.  
Regarding the insurance and advisors industry, I do not see any remarkable results. Nor 
do I find interesting results for the pension industry. But I do see the fewest references to 
international standards within speeches to the pension industry. I will discuss this 
finding in greater detail in the next section.  
 Banking (21) Accountants 
(10) 
Insurers and 
advisors (26) 
Pension (16) 
Moral 
reputation 
46 20 39 19 
Performative 93  51  78 39 
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reputation 
Procedural 
reputation 
42 21 48 23 
Technical 
reputation 
46 19 50 35 
Table 11. Scores per industry 
 
6.6 Internationalization  
One of the issues concerning the reputation management of the AFM was whether I 
could find any effect of international networks on the reputation management of the 
AFM regarding the domestic industry. My question was whether or not I could find links 
between an increased importance of transnational networks in regulatory decision-
making for the AFM and any changes in its reputation towards the industry. I thought 
that a rise in references to international standards would be a sign that the AFM is 
concerned with explaining its role in transnational networks to maintain its domestic 
reputation. In this section I will therefore focus solely on this link, using the results 
obtained in the analysis of the speeches.  
Internationalization and the position of board members 
First, I will discuss how internationalization is important in the results for each board 
member. In short, I see only a few interesting results here. As argued in the previous 
section on the differences between board members, I mostly see differences in terms of 
performative and moral reputation. Are these not related to international developments 
in financial regulation? Although I cannot say with absolute certainty, it seems likely that 
the differences originate, as argued, in the various sectors of the regulated industry and 
time-periods.  
Internationalization and the different industries 
In general, the references to international standards have remained fairly stable over 
the years. Do I see a variation in terms of explanations about their participation in 
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transnational networks between the different industries: banking, pension, accountants 
and insurers? I have found slight differences between the industries (more international 
references for the banking and accounting industry) but these are too small for me to 
draw any significant conclusions.  
Internationalization and different periods of time 
The last variation concerns the different periods for which I analyzed speeches. In the 
period 2006 to 2008, with the financial crisis unravelling towards the end of 2008, I also 
see references to international standards, but slightly less and especially somewhat 
different references when it comes to their content. They mostly concern explanations of 
how the crisis is an international challenge. Moreover, in some of the speeches the AFM 
challenges why they cannot tackle such an issue on its own and how the problem is one 
of international magnitude.  
A slight increase is witnessed in the period 2010-2013, which coincides with the 
establishment of the ESMA, but it is a very small increase. It is also, broadly speaking, the 
period in which most initiatives concerning new platforms for international cooperation 
on financial regulation were established. For examples of speeches in this period, I refer 
to the digital appendix of this paper. In the period 2014-2016, with Merel van 
Vroonhoven as chairwoman, references to international standards remain stable. It 
might be that in this period, the ESMA had been established for a couple of years. As 
such, it might have become standard for the domestic industry to consider the context of 
the ESMA in their judgement of the work of the AFM. Therefore, the AFM did not have to 
explain as much with regard to their participation in this transnational network in the 
speeches as during the crisis years. This is however something that requires further 
research.  
To decide whether the differences in references to international standards between the 
various periods are significant, I turn to the use of the Chi-Square statistic in the next 
section. I will also return to this question in the chapter on my analysis of the interview 
results. 
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6.7 Statistical significance of most important results 
My analysis showed that, at first sight, it seems that we find an increase in the strictness 
of the AFM over the years but not a large increase in the references to international 
standards. As an important statistical check of the most important results from my 
content analysis, I estimated the Chi-Square statistic for the results concerning 
performative reputation and international standards to make sure that my 
interpretation of these results is valid.  
Let us first look at performative reputation and its frequency throughout the years. To 
provide the reader with a sense of understanding of how I calculated the different Chi-
Square statistics in my research, I present the table that I used in my analysis of the 
speeches. I first look at the references (the observed scores) to performative reputation 
over the years 2006 to 2016 (categories). The expected score has been calculated by 
dividing the total amount of references (326) by the amount of speeches (87). As such, 
with a normal distribution I would expect an average of 3.7 references which can be 
linked to performative reputation per speech. I then look at the amount of speeches per 
year, and multiply the expected number of 3.7 by the amount of speeches in that year to 
calculate the expected value for each category/year. This gives us a Chi-Square statistic 
of 57.7.  
I have eleven different years and hence eleven different categories: this gives us ten 
degrees of freedom. Using the Chi-Square table, I can then see that we can reject (with 
95% certainty) the null hypothesis of a normal distribution of our values. As the Chi-
Square statistic illustrates, the differences are indeed significant. This means that my 
findings show that in the period 2009 to 2012, there was indeed a significant difference 
in the communication of the AFM when it comes to emphasizing their performative 
reputation. 
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Category Observed Expected Residual=(observed-
expected) 
(obs-
exp)^2 
(obs-
exp)^2 / 
exp 
2006 1 3.7 -2.7 7.29 2.0 
2007 4 7.4 -3.4 11.56 1.6 
2008 30 59.2 -29.2 852.64 14.4 
2009 88 51.8 36.2 1310.44 25.3 
2010 48 33.3 14.7 216.09 6.5 
2011 52 48.1 3.9 15.21 0.4 
2012 23 18.5 4.5 20.25 1.1 
2013 16 17.1 -1.1 1.2  0.08 
2014 39 40.7 -1.7 2.9 0.07 
2015 20 29.6 -9.6 92.16 3.1 
2016 5 11.1 -6,1 37.2 3.4 
Table 12. Calculating a Chi-Square statistic for performative reputation scores 
2006 1/1 2012 5/23 
2007 2/4 2013 5/16 
2008 16/31 2014 11/39 
2009 14/96 2015 8/20 
2010 9/ 49 2016 3/5 
2011 13/41 Chi square 57.7=significant 
Table 13. References to performative reputation for each year (number of 
speeches/total amount of references) 
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What about the relative stability in references to international standards? I did the same 
calculations for the references to international standards. In total I have 73 references, 
which divided by the total amount of speeches gives us an average of 0.9 references per 
available speech. As our Chi-Square statistic of 4.8 shows, these small differences are 
indeed not significant. I therefore conclude that the AFM has not made any significant 
changes in its communication towards the industry in terms of references to 
international networks.  
2006 1/0 2012 5/4 
2007 2/1 2013 5/5 
2008 16/13 2014 11/9 
2009 14/12 2015 9/7 
2010 9/7 2016 3/3 
2011 13/12 Chi square 4.8=not significant 
Table 14. References to international standards for each year 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
What can I conclude from the analysis of 87 speeches made by board members over the 
years regarding the reputation management of the AFM?  
First, the AFM does indeed focus on building its moral, procedural and technical 
reputation when it communicates with the industry. I have found that, overall, board 
members regularly explained how the AFM values ideals such as collectivism and works 
on establishing frequent consultation with the industry. They also explained, that the 
agency has enough knowledgeable experts within its organization to understand the 
complexities of the work of firms in the industry. References to these three forms of 
reputation remained stable over the years. References to the performative reputation of 
the AFM however increased over the years. As our Chi-Square statistic confirmed, I 
found a significant difference between the deepest point of the financial crises (2009 to 
2012) and the periods before (2006, 2007 and 2008) and after (2013 to 2016). It seems 
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that the AFM has been making efforts to enhance its image as a rigorous regulator in its 
communication with the industry during the financial crises. After the most hectic 
period of the financial crises, I also found that the AFM started to emphasize its 
understanding of the industry more and paid more compliments to firms.  
Second, I saw stability in references to international standards from 2009 to 2016. 
Zooming in on each of the industries, I found that the most references were made in 
speeches aimed at the banking and accounting industry but as I have explained these 
differences were too small to draw any significant conclusions. But why this consistency 
in references over the years? Not even since 2011, when the ESMA was founded, did I 
find any significant increase, confirmed by the Chi-Square statistic, in the references to 
international standards in speeches made by the AFM board members. Is the growth in 
transnational networks then something that in the view of the AFM is not a threat to 
their reputation?  
There are several questions that arise from the content analysis of the speeches that I 
hope to answer with the findings from my interviews. The first question concerns the 
rise in performative reputation and the more pro-active and rigorous attitude of the 
AFM. Has the AFM really become stricter regarding the industry and does this indeed 
strengthen their reputation as financial regulator? This would indicate an example of 
successful reputation management. The second question is to do with the impact of the 
financial crisis and its link to the rise in performative reputation. Is it really the case that 
the AFM has strengthened its reputation due to the negative impact of the financial crisis 
on its reputation? The last question concerns the impact of the growth in transnational 
networks. I found no significant rise in the references of board members to international 
standards over the years: does this mean that the AFM is not concerned about the effects 
of this change in decision-making capacity on its reputation?  
In the next chapter I will attempt to answer these questions in my analysis of the 
interview results.  
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CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on communication by the AFM, but reputation 
management is also about the actions of an agency. To complement the results that I 
obtained from the analysis of the AFM speeches, I conducted seven interviews: two with 
experts on financial regulation and five with representatives of the different industry 
sectors. The goal of the first two interviews was to provide context information about my 
research and gain insight into how the AFM functions as an organization. What aspects 
of reputation are important in the relationship between the AFM and the Dutch 
regulated industry? To what extent is reputation management possible in the Dutch 
context? And do these experts see an impact in the increase in transnational networks 
on the functioning of the AFM?  
The aim of the other five interviews is to see how the industry itself judges the work of 
the AFM: what do they think of the reputation of the AFM? The latter is an important 
consideration. As I have shown in the previous section, the AFM has changed its message 
towards the industry in recent years. But has this also genuinely influenced their 
reputation with the industry? And in what way? This is the essence of the reputation 
management of the AFM: bridging the gap between the desired image and the 
reputation amongst firms in the Dutch industry.  
First, the analysis of the results from the context interviews will be discussed to provide 
a background for the rest of this section. I will then look at the results from the other five 
interviews in line with the different forms of reputation of the AFM and the impact of 
internationalization in general. Whilst doing this, I will also touch upon the different 
problems in the three-step cycle of reputation management and action (standard-
setting, behavior modifying and information gathering) and communication as building 
blocks of reputation. Then, the results related to the questions that remained after my 
content analysis from the previous chapter will be reviewed.  
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7.2 Understanding the Dutch system of financial regulation and the AFM 
I will start with a discussion of the results from our context-interviews with two Dutch 
experts on financial regulation who also have direct experience in working with the 
AFM. Our first respondent is a professor and current member of the AFM Committee on 
Financial Reporting and Accounting and our second expert has been a member of the 
Supervisory Board of the AFM in the recent past. The results from these discussions 
provided us with context information regarding this case and gave me some direction in 
the interpretation of the other interview results and in the analysis of the speeches.  
With her extensive experience in the Dutch and European field of financial regulation 
and her work as AFM Committee member, our first respondent emphasized that 
reputation is indeed important to the AFM as regulatory agency. One of the important 
distinctions she drew was between authority and power: she explained that these are 
two different things (see the interview transcript for the original words in Dutch). The 
AFM might have been assigned formal tasks by its political principal and as such will 
have a formal degree of authority, but how this eventually affects its position towards 
the industry depends to a degree greatly on its reputation. Power and respect, as 
discussed in our theoretical framework, will make it easier for the AFM to enforce 
regulation. Her belief was also that there were quite large differences amongst the board 
members due to personal style, but she also emphasized how these speeches are 
prepared by AFM personnel. As such, it can be expected that a speech is seen within the 
organization of the AFM as a way in which it can enhance its image as regulator: the 
second step in the cycle of reputation management. But also, and this relates to the 
consistency problem in the three-step cycle, that the AFM is fragmented in terms of 
which areas the board members choose to emphasize: it is difficult to build a consistent 
image if an organization as large and varied as the AFM sends out different messages 
from different board members.  
She confirmed that the financial crisis was a turning point in the behavior of the AFM. In 
her view, before this period, the AFM had an attitude which can be summarized as 'as 
long as things are going well, we are happy'. This implied that the AFM would of course 
intervene if things went wrong, but did not actively pursue policies that would focus on 
preventing undesirable behavior by the industry. This changed with the commotion 
resulting from the crisis in the Netherlands. Her opinion was that the AFM had become 
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stricter and worked more on preventing problems in the industry than before. She 
assumed that the increase in international networks such as the ESMA had an impact on 
the way the AFM had tried to form its reputation but could not provide solid information 
from her own experiences.  
This respondent was, in addition to her position as AFM Committee member, also an 
academic expert on the Dutch pension system. Therefore, she was able to comment on 
the specific relationship between the AFM and the pension industry. She confirmed the 
findings from our earlier analysis: for the pension industry, the DNB is the most 
important financial supervisor when it comes to international regulatory cooperation. 
There are some European networks that are relevant for the pension industry but the 
priority of pension funds seems to lie with the DNB.  
Our second respondent was a former member of the Supervisory Board of the AFM and 
well-known expert on financial regulation in the Netherlands. She also had over ten 
years of experience working with the DNB as researcher. Her experiences showed that 
reputation was very important for financial supervisors. In her time as researcher at the 
DNB, several times she was engaged in research into the reputation of the Dutch central 
bank. Trust in regulators and the financial system was important in her words. If people 
do not trust the system of financial supervision, they will not trust the financial system 
itself: a matter of reputation.  
One of the important points she made (a point that was also briefly touched upon in the 
other context-interview) was that the AFM is always looking for more tasks. Towards 
the end of each year, the AFM sends a report to the ministry of Finance in which they 
explain what they have done and will be doing, but in which they also consistently 
inquire whether their mandate can be expanded, at least according to this respondent. 
The AFM has indeed gained more tasks over the last years. Which impact has this had on 
its standing with the domestic industry? I will come back to this point when we discuss 
the five interviews with the regulated industry.  
This point, which comes up again in the industry interviews, also relates to the politics 
problem. Both respondents emphasized that the AFM is, in one way or the other, an 
instrument of elected bodies in carrying out public policies. So, whatever the industry 
thinks of certain policies, if the political principal decides that a certain choice is the path 
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to follow, the AFM has to live with it.  As such, the politics problem is a more 
fundamental problem for the AFM as it also limits their possibilities when it comes to 
the other four problems in reputation management.  
 
She was not able to say a great deal about the AFM and the specifics of transnational 
networks, but she did state that international networks might 'open the eyes' of the AFM 
to other practices and the European reality of financial regulation. But also, that the AFM 
felt like that it had to show other national regulators how high the quality of the AFM as 
an organization was. As such, the AFM almost expected that a range of regulatory tools 
that it had introduced in the Netherlands would also be implemented in other European 
regulation. This could indicate that the AFM feels as if it is one of the organizations 
within the transnational networks that leads European discussions concerning the 
setting of standards (which would mean that they are often able to realize their own 
goals, which would prevent them from having to explain unwanted European decisions 
to the domestic industry). This would however have to be proven by empirical research 
in the future.   
 
7.3 Which forms of reputation are important for the regulated industry? 
The expert interviews seem to have confirmed that reputation really does matter in the 
relationship between the AFM and the regulated industry and hence for the quality of 
financial regulation. That is why I now turn to the analysis of the interviews with 
representatives from the industry. The results concerning the view of the industry on 
the different forms of reputation will be reviewed first to create a broader image of the 
reputation of the AFM according to the regulated firms.  
Moral reputation 
Morality was not the most significant topic during the interviews with the industry. The 
AFM and its elaborate emphasis on protecting clients and providing transparency as a 
firm were seen as self-evident by respondents: of course the AFM focusses on building 
an image as financial regulator promoting morality. As such, there was not a great deal 
of discussion as to whether or not firms value the efforts of the AFM to stimulate aspects 
such as transparency, collectivism or morality in general.  
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An interview with a representative of the banking industry explained the general 
attitude of most firms towards the moral reputation of the AFM. The respondent 
explained how the cooperation between her association and the AFM was intensive and 
transparent and that the AFM thought trust in the financial sector and the banking 
system was crucial. Hence, the agency often discussed it in its communication with the 
sector. The AFM also emphasized that, in her view, the sector should have its own 
responsibility in this regard: they are the ones who have to regain the trust of the 
general public. The view of this respondent provided a fair summary of the findings on 
moral reputation in the other interviews.  
Performative reputation 
Questions on performative reputation brought more interesting discussions during the 
interviews. One respondent made significant comments on how the AFM was always 
looking to broaden its mandate. This respondent saw a tendency in the behavior of the 
AFM to also set norms and direct the policy of firms in the industry, tasks that did not 
belong to the official mandate of the AFM; 
‘’ For our sector, the absolute primacy for the development of laws lies with the 
legislator and not with the financial supervisor. If you look at how the AFM operates 
they are actually also setting norms for firms. We understand of course that this is 
sometimes inevitable, as many laws have been formulated on the basis of open norms. 
But in many cases it seems as though the AFM wants to set all norms instead of the 
political principle ‘’ 
This critique is confirmed in the other interviews: the AFM sometimes works too hard in 
areas that are not included in its legislative mandate. The AFM wants to be a respected 
and rigid regulator, but that has sometimes caused friction with the industry as the AFM 
has for example intervened in policymaking areas. One can imagine that this is because 
the AFM wants to show its added value and also appear as a more pro-active and stricter 
regulator, something that the analysis of the speeches has confirmed. But it seems that 
this attitude comes at the cost of discontent within the industry. It sees the behavior of 
the AFM as that of an organization wanting to do too much.  
An important point that another respondent made relates to this critique that the AFM is 
always looking for more work and tasks. According to this respondent, their industry 
 68 
 
sometimes doubted the added value of a range of actions by the AFM. As the sector 
carries the costs for financial supervision (a very important aspect concerning 
reputational uniqueness) it also expects that the AFM will do necessary and useful 
things with their money: 
 '' If the AFM is busy creating different research departments on all sorts of different 
subjects, we tend to doubt what the added value is, and can become pretty critical '' .   
This criticism was expressed in almost all of the interviews. One respondent emphasized 
how his association had battled the strong rise in supervision costs. In the period 2000 
to 2014, these costs had almost tripled. And as of January 2015, the contribution of the 
Dutch government to the costs of supervision, which amounted to almost 42 million 
euros, was removed. He also emphasized that there were plans in European 
transnational networks to have the costs of supervisory agencies such as EIOPA paid by 
the financial industries.  
Another important made by respondents with experience at the political heart of the 
Netherlands, in The Hague, was that they also felt that the AFM was sometimes too 
sensitive to criticism of the Dutch parliament. In their opinion, the AFM should be 
completely independent and neutral, which was not always the case: an interesting 
remark considering the politics problem already mentioned.  
Technical reputation 
Is the AFM also seen as an organization that is professional and sufficiently equipped to 
fulfill its tasks according to the industry? In general, the answer to this question is yes. 
One respondent explained that he strongly believed in the reputational uniqueness of the 
AFM: for a well-functioning and healthy financial sector, the Twin Peaks model with a 
separate organization such as the AFM was most fitting. He believed that the AFM had 
sufficient expertise and knowledge of the sector to do its work.  
Other interviews confirmed the image amongst the regulated industry of the AFM as an 
organization with a strong technical reputation. Two respondents did have one or two 
particular remarks however.  These respondents believed that, although their overall 
impression was that the AFM had enough people with expertise of their sector, they 
sometimes came across employees who were not that knowledgeable.  Overall however, 
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all of the respondents believed in the Twin Peaks model in the Netherlands and thought 
that the AFM was an important organization for financial supervision, that could 
perform better as a an agency separate from the DNB: the reputational uniqueness of 
the AFM was fairly strong in this sense and the uniqueness problem does not seem to be 
an issue for the AFM at present.  
Procedural reputation 
Newsletters, weekly meetings, monthly reports: there is a lot of deliberation between 
the AFM and the regulated industry. Respondents confirmed that overall the AFM kept 
close contact with the sector through deliberation and procedures. Both at the top-level 
(between members of the board) and the middle-level (between AFM and industry 
personnel) there was more than enough room for discussion and input.  
An important point that was made in the majority of the interviews was however that 
the AFM was almost always open to a discussion but is also often inclined to follow its 
own opinion on issues. So in terms of procedural reputation, the results from these 
interviews also point to an attitude that can be described as 'agree to disagree'.  Most 
respondents recognized that this attitude was of course also part of the AFM and its role 
as regulator.  
One of the findings from our content analysis was that the AFM often refers to legislative 
procedures (procedural agreements) to explain what its position in a debate is. The 
results from the interviews confirm that legislative procedures are important to the 
work of the AFM and how the industry judges its work, but as the discussion on 
performative reputation has already shown, it also oversteps these legislative 
boundaries. This emphasizes the political context of the work of the AFM and hence 
relates to the politics problem in the reputation management cycle. This is an issue that 
would demand further research, as I will argue in the reflection at the end of this paper.  
Impact of the financial crisis on the different forms of reputation 
Another important topic within this research is the impact of the severe financial crises 
of recent years on the functioning and reputation of the AFM. As we saw from the results 
of our content analysis, there seemed to be a clear increase in references to rigor as the 
impact of the crises grew (2008 to 2012). After the deepest point of the financial crisis, 
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we witnessed relatively less mention of rigor and found more references to 
understanding the industry and complimenting their progress (2013 to 2016).  
What did the representatives of the regulated industry think of the impact of the 
financial crises on the functioning and reputation of the AFM? Did they see any 
differences between each period? Indeed, they did. The results seem to be pretty much 
the same as those of the content analysis and remarks made during the context 
interviews. Before the financial crises, the AFM was seen as more flexible and gave more 
leeway to self-regulation by the different sectors. This changed after the crisis years. The 
respondents all agreed that the crisis had had a negative impact on the reputation of the 
AFM and as such proposed a direct link between the effect of the outbreak of the 
financial crisis on the reputation of the AFM and its stricter and more pro-active 
behavior in recent years.  
An important distinction laid out by one of the respondents was the difference between 
the effects of the crisis and those issues such as the bankruptcy of the DNB Bank. In her 
opinion, these were two (related) problems of which the latter led to the most changes 
in the organization and reputation of the AFM. Again, this particular aspect is also one 
that would call for additional research in the future.  
 
7.4 Internationalization: can we explain its limited impact on the message of the 
AFM? 
Having discussed the broader view regarding the industry on the different forms of 
reputation of the AFM and the impact of the financial crisis, I will now zoom into one of 
the most important aspects of this research: what has the growth in transnational 
networks and the increase of regulatory decision-making at the international level 
meant for the domestic reputation of the AFM? In the previous section on the content 
analysis of AFM speeches, I discovered that internationalization did not have an impact 
on the message of the AFM as severely as expected. With these interviews, an important 
goal is to uncover if and why – in the view of the industry – internationalization has not 
changed the reputation of the AFM terribly much.  
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As discussed in our chapter on the context of this research, different transnational 
networks matter for different industries. In general, however, the results from the 
interviews confirm the findings from our content analysis that thus far 
internationalization has not affected the reputation of the AFM very much. Respondents 
from various industries – from the pension sector to the finance industry – state that the 
growth of transnational networks in financial regulation has not changed the 
functioning of the AFM significantly or altered their view of the agency. Now the major 
question is why, thus far, internationalization has not impacted heavily on the 
reputation of the AFM.  
One respondent concisely described the European level of regulatory decision-making 
as an extra layer on top of national ones: the AFM had to consider explaining how in 
European networks certain decisions were made and why. He emphasized that, when, 
for example he participated in Eurofinance (a European network for finance companies) 
colleagues from other countries were always very impressed by Dutch standards. He 
believed that Dutch financial supervision was much further on in a lot of areas than most 
other European national regulators. This was something that the first respondent of our 
context interviews also emphasized: the position of Dutch regulatory agencies in 
European financial regulation is that of forerunner. This has important implications for 
the domestic reputation of the AFM, the respondent explained. Because most newly 
introduced standards developed in European networks already exist in the Dutch 
financial supervisory system, the AFM is not forced to implement and explain new 
standards when they originate from transnational regulatory cooperation. So, returning 
to his metaphor of an extra layer on top of already existing layers: the European layer is, 
up until now, fairly transparent and thinly spread over the Dutch financial industry. 
As we saw in the results from our context interviews, representatives from the regulated 
industry also confirmed the position of Dutch financial regulation as exemplary in 
European transnational networks.  As one interviewee explained, this also means that 
when European directives or regulations come into force, this often oversees matters 
that have already been introduced in the Netherlands in the (recent) past: 
‘’ Everything that stems from the client's interest, to defend the client's interest, there 
you see in the Netherlands that it has been included in the national law and regulations 
for a number of years now. You see that Dutch regulations are slowly becoming 
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European regulations. I think that it is important to look at the role of the Netherlands in 
general, if you are talking about legislation and regulations in the financial sector, then I 
think that in most Member States we anticipate European legislation for years ahead. ‘’ 
Does the transparency of the AFM in its daily work (as we discussed in our section on its 
moral reputation) possibly mean that it is not forced to explain in speeches what it does 
in transnational networks? One of the respondents thought the AFM was very open in 
their explanation of what the regulator does and what it tries to achieve in transnational 
networks, such as the ESMA. Especially when compared to colleagues from other 
countries, this respondent thought that the AFM was remarkably transparent. One 
example she discussed was the MiFid: the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. For 
her sector, it has always been clear what the priorities were for the AFM in European 
negotiations on this directive. Moreover, she felt that banks were able to tell the AFM 
what was important for them in terms of the results from talks in these European 
networks. However, she also explained that it was sometimes unclear who was 
responsible for what aspect in the development of international financial regulation. 
Concerning the MiFid, the AFM sometimes still wanted to influence the way in which the 
directive was interpreted, also in areas that had already been completed.  
 
7.5  Conclusions 
What can I conclude from the analysis of the seven interviews? I first discussed how the 
industry judged the work of the AFM according to the different forms of reputation. It 
seems that, according to the industry, the AFM is very transparent and receptive to 
criticism (moral and procedural reputation) concerning their work. Whether they 
actually will change their behavior as a result of feedback from the industry is another 
matter: they often agree to disagree. The industry also believes that – although there 
were sometimes slight doubts about some departments within the organization – the 
AFM has enough expertise and capable professionals within its organization to fulfill its 
tasks.  All respondents also see the added value of the AFM as a separate organization 
alongside the DNB: its reputational uniqueness is strong in this sense and as such the 
uniqueness problem does not seem to be too much of an issue for the agency.  
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Reputation management was the second focus point of my analysis in this chapter. I saw 
the most interesting results regarding this aspect in our discussion of performative 
reputation. It seems that the AFM has not completely succeeded in bridging the gap 
between its desired image and the reputation that it has within the industry. As I have 
discussed in my content analysis, the AFM has become stricter and more pro-active in 
their role towards the industry. The industry has however perceived this in a somewhat 
different way: they feel that the AFM often steps outside its legislative mandate. This is 
interesting, because, as one of the interviews literally illustrated, it can result in firms 
trying to avoid interference by the AFM because they are apprehensive about their 
meddling with other (policy) areas of the sector: an unsuccessful case of reputation 
management.  
The politics, constituency and uniqueness problems proved valuable theoretical 
concepts in understanding some of these reputation management issues facing the AFM 
and is probably why it has not completely succeeded in bridging the reputation gap. 
Especially the first problem, the politics problem, proved to be an issue that explains the 
difficulties of the AFM in its reputation management: something to discuss in the 
chapter on my final conclusions. The charisma problem and excellency problem did not 
appear so vividly as other issues for the AFM. I will reflect upon this point in the next 
chapter.  
The impact of the financial crisis on the functioning and reputation of the AFM was 
severe. As expected, our respondents confirmed that the crisis years changed the way 
that the AFM operates. The organization has grown bigger, has become more pro-active 
and stricter and is constantly looking for new tasks because of the damage to its 
reputation endured in recent years. Although not very surprising in itself, this finding 
does reinforce the belief that context and external pressures are important in the work 
and behavior of a regulatory agency.  
Our content analysis in the previous chapter supports the conclusion that the growth in 
transnational networks has not significantly altered the communication of the AFM in 
terms of international standards. It seemed that the AFM was not too concerned with 
altering their reputation because of any change in decision-making capacities. Our 
qualitative analysis explains why. The different respondents emphasized how the AFM is 
a forerunner when it comes to European financial regulation. As such, they are able to 
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propose and realize European standards that already exist in the Dutch financial system. 
This explains why so far we have not found any significant impact of this in the AFM’s 
reputation.  
In the next and final section, I will discuss my conclusions in greater detail and in the 
light of my research question and theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER 8: FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Research question and objective  
At the beginning of this paper, I explained why I believed reputation would be an 
interesting subject for research into financial regulation. The Netherlands and its Twin 
Peaks model of financial supervision proved to be an interesting testing ground with the 
AFM as regulatory agency, selected mainly because of the large amount of criticism it 
has received in recent years. The aim of this paper was therefore to add both to the body 
of academic literature on reputational calculations as well as to provide an answer to 
empirical questions on the functioning of national regulatory agencies in times of 
increasing international cooperation and domestic pressure on their role as regulator as 
a result of the financial crisis. These theoretical and empirical considerations led me to 
the following research question for this paper: 
‘’ How does the increasing trend of regulatory internationalization and pressures 
resulting from the financial crisis affect the reputation management of the Dutch 
Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) towards the regulated industry? ‘’ 
In this paper, I analyzed the communication of the AFM in terms of its reputation and 
whether it changed in the period 2006 to 2016. My objective was to see if I could find 
changes in the message of the AFM that corresponded with any changes in its working 
context: the pressures that followed the financial crisis and the greater role of 
transnational networks in financial regulation. Reputation management is also about 
evaluating the response of the industry (third step of the three-step cycle) and as such I 
aimed to discuss how the industry itself had perceived the reputation of the AFM in this 
period. Overall, my research offered an overview of the complexities that a national 
regulator such as the AFM faces in its reputation management.   
 
8.2 Conclusions  
In this paper, I first discussed the existing work on reputation and public organizations 
within this nascent sub-field of political science. Having reviewed the academic 
literature on reputation for bureaucratic organizations, I concluded that three aspects 
had remained underexposed thus far: the gap between an agency’s desired image and 
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their actual reputation amongst firms in the industry, the impact of the financial crisis 
on its reputation and the effect of the growth in transnational networks in financial 
regulation on the domestic reputation of an agency. In the theoretical framework of this 
paper, the review of the three-step cycle explained the complexities behind reputation 
management. In order to capture changes in reputation, I introduced the different forms 
of reputation as laid down by Carpenter (2010). I argued that the actions and 
communication of an agency were to be seen as the essential building blocks of its 
reputation. My theoretical expectation was that the financial crisis and the growth in 
transnational networks would urge the AFM to make changes in its reputation 
management.  
My mixed-method analysis provided a number of interesting results. Let us first 
consider the impact of transnational networks. My premise was that due to the change 
in the decision-making capacity of the AFM, it would have to respond in order to protect 
its reputation. This impact was smaller than I had expected. In the speeches to the 
industry audience, I did find references to international standards as the AFM explained 
why and how it had participated in transnational networks, but it appears that this has 
not significantly altered their reputation as references remained stable over the total 
period.  My qualitative analysis of the interview results explained why. The Netherlands 
and its regulatory agencies (AFM and DNB) are forerunners in the field of European 
regulation. A great number of regulatory instruments that were implemented in Holland 
in recent years, are now being introduced at a European level. This means that the AFM 
did not have to introduce a significant amount of new legislation to its domestic industry 
and therefore this did not have an impact on its reputation. If anything, the results from 
the interviews show that the industries value the way in which the AFM operates in 
European networks and explains their decisions.  
The second conclusion is that the financial crisis has fundamentally changed the way in 
which the AFM operates. I found many references to the consequences of the financial 
crisis in our analysis of the speeches and discovered links between these issues and a 
stricter and more pro-active stance taken by the AFM towards the industry due to 
pressure on its position in the interview results. These can be linked to reputational 
uniqueness: the AFM has been forced to show that it has added value in the Dutch 
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financial system and therefore engaged in a more rigid approach to the sector which 
sometimes seems to have led to something of a step beyond their legislative mandate. 
This brings me to the third and final conclusion on reputation management drawn from 
my analysis. The AFM has indeed made serious efforts to improve its reputation in 
different ways. It has strengthened its moral reputation through its many references to 
morality, collectivism and the importance of trust in the financial sector. It has engaged 
in consultations with the industry about the form of financial regulation, increasing their 
deliberative standing and hence improving their procedural reputation. They have 
started to develop new areas of research and expanded their organization, which has 
strengthened their technical reputation. But most important is their performative 
reputation. The AFM has done its very best to perform and show that they are more than 
capable of meeting the tasks set by their political principal. But in this case of reputation 
management, as our interviews show, they seem to have carried on too far as the 
industry explained that they now engage in tasks (influencing the direction of policy for 
example) that were not theirs to begin with. These actions endanger the quality of 
financial regulation as firms fear interference by the AFM in their business in aspects 
that do not concern the agency. 
To sum up and in answer to my research question, I can conclude that the international 
crisis and the pressures on financial regulators have in fact changed the reputation 
management of the AFM and its standing within the industry. But these changes have 
also led to somewhat overenthusiastic behavior by the agency and it has started to 
interfere in areas where it is not supposed to tamper. Transnational networks do not 
seem to have mattered for the reputation management of the AFM, not a result that I had 
anticipated. This can be accounted for by the forerunner role of the AFM in European 
financial regulation.   
 
8.3 Implications 
This paper has several implications for research and policy on financial regulation. 
Firstly, it emphasizes that reputation is crucial to the quality of regulation and should be 
paid more attention. The financial crisis has made regulatory agencies in the 
Netherlands aware of this importance and as such I expect that, with the continuing 
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trend of transnational networks, reputation will become an even more important aspect 
of the work of agencies in financial regulation. Regulators and those who study 
regulation should pay more attention to the concept and its underlying mechanisms.  
Secondly, my findings have emphasized the fact that how an agency perceives its own 
reputation is not always how the industry sees it. This has important implications for 
the AFM, but also for regulatory agencies in general. Their behavior could have counter-
productive consequences, such as firms avoiding interference from the AFM because 
they fear that they will meddle in matters that do not concern the agency. Eventually, 
this damages the quality of financial regulation and with it, the sustainability of the 
financial system. Moreover, it seems crucial that agencies not only listen to the industry, 
but actually change their behavior on the basis of their feedback: one must avoid 
agreeing to disagree. I realize however that this is a delicate balance as agencies are also 
expected to be independent.  
Lastly, European networks are only in their infancy, as we have witnessed a less 
significant impact of transnational networks on the domestic reputation of the AFM than 
expected. In the future, I assume that this impact will only increase as new standards 
that are not yet introduced in the Netherlands will be developed in European networks 
on financial regulation. Almost certainly this will complicate their capacity to manage 
their reputation.  
 
8.4 Reflection and future research   
Reputation management is a complex and multi-faceted notion. Some different aspects 
of my research could be improved. First of all, one could question if speeches as sole 
source for data constitute a legitimate representation of the desired reputation of an 
agency. Although the expert interviews taught me that speeches are prepared by AFM 
personnel and as such most likely reflect the view of the entire organization, other 
sources, such as annual or reports to parliament, could strengthen this effort. The same 
applies to interviews with AFM personnel. Moreover, as a large body of literature shows, 
coding texts for content analysis always throws up substance for debate. Ideally, I would 
have chosen to include a second, independent coder to ensure inter-coder reliability and 
strengthen the validity of my research. Lastly, the same can be said for the results from 
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the interviews and the extent to which they can be generalized for other regulatory 
agencies. Additional interviews or large-N surveys amongst firms in the industry could 
have added to a stronger and even more valid image of how the industry sees the 
reputation of the AFM.   
Future research should focus on several aspects concerning reputation management. 
First, the difference between how an agency tries to form its reputation and how it is 
eventually perceived by the industry is an area that offers a great deal of explanatory 
relevance to the quality of financial regulation. Additional empirical research - that also 
considers the impact of transnational networks - will help clarify this mechanism and its 
implications for the quality of regulation.  
Moreover, I have considered a case, a financial regulatory agency in the Netherlands, in 
which the organization has thus far suffered few negative consequences in terms of its 
domestic reputation thanks to its role as forerunner in Europe in its field. Case studies of 
countries that have not enjoyed such a fortunate situation, for example countries in 
which financial regulation has been subjected to fundamental changes because of new 
European standards, could increase our understanding of the consequences of the 
growth in transnational networks on domestic reputation management. Research into 
these complexities will help us to better understand the relationship between regulator 
and domestic industry and, which is the most important aspect in these studies, will 
contribute to realizing successful financial regulation that protects participants in the 
financial system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
References 
Literature 
Caprio, G. (2013) ‘’Financial Regulation After the Crisis: How Did We Get Here and How 
Do We Get Out. ‘’ LSE Financial Markets Group Special Papers Series 213 
Carpenter, D. (2001) ‘’The forging of bureaucratic autonomy: Reputations, networks, 
and policy formation in executive agencies, 1862-1928.’’ Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Carpenter, D. (2002) "Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug 
Approval." American Journal of Political Science 46:490-505. 
Carpenter, D. (2010) Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical 
Regulation at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Carpenter, D. and Moss, D. (2013) ‘’Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
Influence and How to Limit It.’’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Carpenter, D. and Krause, G. (2012) "Reputation and public administration." Public 
Administration Review 72:26-32. 
Davies, H. and D. Green (2008) ‘’Global financial regulation: the essential guide.’’ 
Cambridge: MA Polity. 
Gilad, S. and Yogev, T. (2012) "How reputation regulates regulators: Illustrations from 
the regulation of retail finance." In the Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation, 320-
340. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gilad, S., Maor, M. and Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2013) “Organizational reputation, the content 
of public allegations, and regulatory communication.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory. 
Kelemen, D. (2002) ‘’The politics of eurocratic structure and the new European 
agencies.’’ West European Politics 25 (4): 93-118 
 81 
 
Krause, G. and Douglas, J. (2005) ‘’Institutional Design versus Reputational Effects on 
Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from U.S. Government Macroeconomic and Fiscal 
Projections.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (2): 281–306. 
Kremers, J. and Schoenmaker, D. (2010) ‘’Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands.’’ 
LSE Financial Markets Group Special Papers Series 196. 
Lange, D., P. M. Lee, and Y. Dai. (2010) "Organizational Reputation: A Review." Journal of 
Management 37: 153-184. 
Levi-Faur, D. (2011) ‘’The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’’. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 598: 12-32. 
Levitin, A. (2014) ‘’ The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: a Review Essay. ‘’ Harvard Law Review 127: 1989-2063. 
Lodge, M. and Wegrich, K. (2012) ‘’Managing Regulation. Regulatory Analysis, Politics 
and Policy.’’ Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Luoma-Aho, Vilma. (2007) "Neutral reputation and public sector organizations." 
Corporate Reputation Review 10:124-143. 
Luoma-Aho, V. (2008) "Sector reputation and public organisations." International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 21:446-467. 
Luoma-Aho, V. (2013) “Expectation management for public sector organizations”. Public 
Relations Review 39:248-250. 
Maor, M. (2007) "A scientific standard and an agency's legal independence: Which of 
these reputation protection mechanisms is less susceptible to political moves?" Public 
Administration 85:961-978. 
Maor, M. (2010) "Organizational reputation and jurisdictional claims: The case of the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration." Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 23:133-159. 
Maor, M. (2011) "Organizational reputations and the observability of public warnings in 
10 pharmaceutical markets." Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 24:557-582. 
 82 
 
Maor, M. Gilad, S. and Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2013) "Organizational reputation, regulatory 
talk, and strategic silence." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 23: 
581-608. 
Maor, M. and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2013) "The effect of salient reputational threats on 
the pace of FDA enforcement." Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 26:31-61. 
Maor, M. and Wæraas, A. (2014) ‘’Organizational Reputation in the Public Sector.’’ New 
York: Routledge. 
O’ Toole, D. (2015) ‘’Networks and Networking: The Public Administrative Agendas.’’ 
Public Administration Review 75: 361-371. 
Prast, H. and van Lelyveld, I. (2004) ‘’New Architectures in the Regulation and 
Supervision of Financial Markets and Institutions: The Netherlands.’’ DNB Working 
Paper 21.  
Provan, K. and Kenis, P. (2007) ‘’Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, 
and Effectiveness.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18: 229-252 
Rindova, V. and Martins, L. (2012) ‘’ Show Me the Money: A Multidimensional 
Perspective on Reputation as an Intangible Asset.’’ The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Reputation.  
Van der Hart, H. (1990) "Government Organizations and their Customers in The 
Netherlands: Strategy, Tactics and Operations." European Journal of Marketing 24 (7): 1-
42 
Verdier, P. (2009) ‘’Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits.’’ Yale Journal of 
International Law 34 (1) 
Wæraas, Arild. (2013) "Beauty from within? What bureaucracies stand for." American 
Review of Public Administration. DOI: 10.1177/0275074013480843. 
Wæraas, Arild, and Haldor Byrkjeflot. (2012) "Public sector organizations and 
reputation management: Five problems." International Public Management Journal 
15:186-206. 
 83 
 
Wæraas, Arild and Marianne N. Solbakk. (2009) "Defining the essence of a university: 
Lessons from higher education branding." Higher Education 57: 449-462. 
 
Other references  
AM Web. (2016) ‘’ Kritiek op werkwijze AFM bij opleggen boete. ’’ Online link: 
http://www.amweb.nl/branche/nieuws/2016/6/kritiek-op-werkwijze-afm-bij-
opleggen-boete-1011791 
AM Web. (2017) ‘’AFM verdubbelt aantal formele maatregelen.’’ Online link: 
http://www.amweb.nl/branche/nieuws/2017/4/afm-verdubbelt-aantal-formele-
maatregelen-10194590 
European Commission. (2016) ‘’Financial reforms and their progress’’ Online link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-
reforms-and-their-progress_en 
Financieele Dagblad (2017) ‘’Kritiek op intrekken ABN-Amro boete door AFM.’’ Online 
link: https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1199006/kritiek-op-intrekken-abn-amro-boete-
door-afm 
NRC Handelsblad. (2013) ‘’Vijf jaar na de crisis was 2013 het jaar van ons economisch 
keerpunt. ’’ Online link: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/12/24/vijf-jaar-na-de-crisis-
was-2013-het-jaar-van-ons-economisch-keerpunt-a1493200 
NRC Handelsblad. (2016) ‘’PwC naar de rechter om werkwijze AFM.’’ Online link: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/02/rommelig-welkom-bij-de-afm-7084757-
a1548537 
NRC Handelsblad. (2017) ‘’Rommelig? Welkom bij de AFM.’’ Online link: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/02/rommelig-welkom-bij-de-afm-7084757-
a1548537 
SC Online. (2015) ‘’Toezichthouders DNB en AFM zitten elkaar in de weg. ’’ Online link: 
http://www.sconline.nl/interview/toezichthouders-dnb-en-afm-zitten-elkaar-de-weg 
Website of the AFM (2017) Online link: www.afm.nl  
